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Abstract: Insurance regulation is ostensibly the primary domain of
the states. In practice, however, the most important and powerful entity in
insurance regulation is not a state at all, but a non-profit corporation known
as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, or NAIC. Much of
the NAIC’s power lies in its production of various “handbooks” and
“manuals” that have the force of law because they are incorporated by
reference in state insurance codes. Under this statutory scheme, when the
NAIC updates or changes its various manuals, handbooks, or accounting
forms, it also changes state insurance regulation. Because the NAIC is a
private entity, it produces these various materials that have the force of law
without being bound by any safeguards that ordinarily accompany the
production of regulation, whether at the state or federal level. Moreover, the
NAIC uses its unique accreditation program to directly pressure state
legislatures to delegate this authority to it. This Article argues that this
scheme violates basic separation of powers and non-delegation principles
embedded in every state Constitution. Under any reasonable version of these
principles, the delegation of state regulatory authority to a private entity that
directly pressures legislatures to make this delegation and whose actions are
not reviewable through any formal judicial or administrative process is
unconstitutional. Recognizing this conclusion has the potential to improve
state insurance regulation by increasing the accountability of state regulators
and the NAIC. But it also carries the risk of undermining state insurance
regulation by frustrating efforts to promote uniform national standards.
However, this Article suggests that state legislatures can enact reforms that
simultaneously remedy the unconstitutional structure of state insurance
regulation while preserving the many practical benefits that flow from
delegating production of regulatory standards to a single, national entity like
the NAIC. In particular, they can establish an entity through an interstate
compact that is truly independent from state insurance regulators and that is
empowered to review the NAIC’s production of regulatory materials that
have the force of law.
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INTRODUCTION
Insurance regulation is ostensibly the primary domain of the states.1
In practice, however, the most important and powerful entity in insurance
regulation is, without question, not a state at all. Nor is it even a government
entity. Instead, it is a private, non-profit corporation known as the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, or NAIC.2
In many contexts, the NAIC’s role in state insurance regulation is
uncontroversial. For instance, the NAIC produces model insurance statutes
and regulations. Much like any other model law project,3 states sometimes
adopt these models wholesale, sometimes choose not to adopt them, and
sometimes adopt them with significant changes.4 The NAIC also affords
state insurance regulators an opportunity to collaborate with one another,
provides both regulators and consumers with an array of services, and
conducts various public information campaigns.5
But the NAIC’s true power lies in its direct production of insurance
regulatory materials that have the force of law, a category that includes over
a dozen “handbooks” and “manuals.”6 These materials dictate (among many
1

McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012)).
2
See generally KENNETH ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE
LAW AND REGULATION (6th ed. 2015); Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation
in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 (1999).
3
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final
Draft No. 2, 2018).
4
All model laws and regulations are available at NAIC Model Laws,
Regulations, and Guidelines, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS,
http://www.naic.org/store_model_laws.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2018). For
each model, the NAIC maintains an up-to-date list indicating which
jurisdictions have enacted that model or a substantially similar version.
5
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 111-13.
6
Examples include the (1) Accounting Practices and Procedures
Manual, (2) Annual Statement Blank, (3) Annual Statement Instructions, (4)
Financial Analysis Handbook, (5) Financial Condition Examiner’s
Handbook, (6) Insurance Regulatory Information System Ratio Manual, (7)
NAIC Uniform Life, Accident and Health, Annuity and Credit Product
Coding Matrix, (8) Own Risk and Solvency Assessment Guidance Manual,
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other things) the information that insurers and other regulated entities must
regularly report to regulators, the methodologies they must use to determine
their capital levels, and the accounting standards that they must employ to
calculate their assets and liabilities. They also constrain the work of
regulators, in addition to regulated entities, dictating the methodologies they
must use when conducting financial and market conduct exams.7
These documents have the force of law because virtually every
state’s insurance laws say they do.8 More specifically, the insurance codes
of virtually every state requires insurers and state regulators to adhere to the
rules that are detailed in the most recent versions of these NAIC materials.9
As a result, when the NAIC updates or changes any of its various manuals,
handbooks, or accounting forms, it also changes state insurance regulation—
without further action by the democratically accountable representatives of
the states. This practice is one particularly troubling type of a more general
statutory drafting practice known as dynamic incorporation by reference.10

(9) Purposes and Procedures Manual of the NAIC Investment Analysis
Office, (10) Risk Based Capital Forecasting and Instructions, and (11)
Securities Valuation Manual. See S. 341, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ind.
2018),
2018 Ind.
Acts
1167,
http://iga.in.gov/staticdocuments/2/3/f/b/23fbf999/SB0341.04.ENRH.pdf (compiling these).
7
Examples of such manuals include: NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS,
FINANCIAL CONDITION EXAMINERS HANDBOOK, and NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS, MARKET REGULATION HANDBOOK EXAMINATION STANDARDS.
8
One partial exception is Indiana. See id. Indiana’s Senate Enrolled Act
No. 341 changes all statutory references to NAIC materials so that they refer
to the 2017 edition of those materials. At the same time, however, the
legislation specifies that the “commissioner may implement” materials
updated by the NAIC “in the regulation of the business of insurance” so long
as the commissioner reports the amendment to the legislative council and
standing committees. See id. ch. 1.5, § 1(c).
9
See, e.g., 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2602 (West
2018). Some state statutes do not explicitly reference the most recent
versions of NAIC documents. But even in these cases, regulators require
insurers to comply with the most recent versions of NAIC materials.
10
See Jim Rossi, Dynamic Incorporation of Federal Law, 77 OHIO ST.
L.J. 457 (2016). See also John Mark Keyes, Incorporation by Reference in
Legislation, 25 STATUTE L. REV. 180 (2004) (distinguishing among four
different types of text that can be incorporated by reference, as well as
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Because the NAIC is a private entity, it produces these various
materials that have the force of law without being bound by any of the
procedural safeguards that ordinarily accompany the production of
regulation, whether at the state or federal level.11 For instance, the NAIC is
not required by any law to provide the public with notice and an opportunity
to comment on these materials before they are adopted, though it generally
does so voluntarily. It also need not disclose information that would be
publicly-accessible if held by a public entity. And nothing that the NAIC
produces is subject to judicial review or routine oversight by an
administrative body.12
Even more gallingly, while the NAIC’s power to directly set many
of the details of state insurance regulation is itself a function of state law, in
many cases state lawmakers are effectively compelled by the NAIC itself to
delegate this authority to the private entity. The NAIC manages this
staggering feat through its Financial Standards and Accreditation Program.
Under this program, states can only be accredited if they adopt a set of NAIC
model laws, or their substantial equivalent.13 And it is those very laws that
incorporate by reference NAIC manuals and handbooks.
Although the NAIC cannot mandate that states participate in its
accreditation program, it has cleverly designed the program so that states
effectively have no choice on the matter. That is why every single state is
accredited. The NAIC accomplishes this by including a seemingly innocuous
provision in the model laws that states must adopt to be accredited:
accredited state insurance departments are only permitted to defer to the
solvency regulation of an insurer’s home state (i.e. its state of domestication)
between incorporations by reference that are “static” (fixed in time) and
“ambulatory” (linked to the most recent versions of the incorporated text)).
11
State administrative law is variable. However, it generally follows
many of the basic principles of federal administrative law with respect to the
availability of judicial review and the requirements for agencies to provide
the public with notice and an opportunity to comment on a range of
administrative actions.
12
State administrative law is variable. However, it generally follows
many of the basic principles of federal administrative law with respect to the
availability of judicial review and the requirements for agencies to provide
the public with notice and an opportunity to comment on a range of
administrative actions.
13
See infra Section I.B.
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if the home state is itself accredited.14 As a result, any insurer domesticated
in a state that lost its accreditation would quickly “redomesticate” to another
state.15 Failing to do so would subject it to financial scrutiny in every state
where it sold coverage. Such redomestication requires moving the insurer’s
principal place of business, as well as the taxes and jobs that come along with
it.16 In a real sense, then, the NAIC – a private entity subject to none of the
normal safeguards that ordinarily constrain the administrative state – has
developed a complex system that effectively compels states to delegate to it
the authority to produce many of the key details of state insurance regulation
as it sees fit.
This scheme, I argue, violates basic separation of powers and nondelegation principles embedded in every state constitution. Although state
constitutions vary, they all vest in a legislative branch the power to make
laws, and they all are understood to limit the legislature’s power to delegate
this authority elsewhere.17 Under any reasonable version of this principle, I
argue, the delegation of state regulatory authority to a private entity that
directly pressures legislatures to make this delegation and whose actions are
not reviewable through any formal judicial or administrative process is
unconstitutional. The Article is the first in-depth analysis of these

14

See MODEL LAW ON EXAMINATIONS § 3(C) (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS 1999) (“In lieu of an examination under this Act of a foreign or
alien insurer licensed in this state, the commissioner may accept an
examination report on the company as prepared by the insurance department
for the company’s state of domicile…only if…the insurance department was
at the time of the examination accredited under the NAIC’s Financial
Regulation Standards and Accreditation Program….”).
15
See infra Section I.B.
16
See REDOMESTICATION MODEL BILL § 1 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS 2006) (“An insurer that is organized under the laws of any other
state and is admitted to do business in this state for the purpose of writing
insurance may become a domestic insurer by…and by designating its
principal place of business at a place in this state.”); MODEL LAW ON
EXAMINATIONS (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 1999) (noting that virtually
every single state has adopted the NAIC Redomestication Model Law, and
the small handful that have not have “related activity”.).
17
See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (2009).
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constitutional issues, notwithstanding the fact that several prominent former
and current officials have alluded to this issue for decades.18
The Article’s argument unfolds in four Parts. Part I begins by briefly
introducing the NAIC’s governance structure, funding model, and
18

Dating as far back as 1991, Roy Woodall – the former independent
member of the Financial Stability Oversight Counsel with Insurance
Expertise – warned that “national regulation of insurance is the culmination
of a state supported regulatory scheme whereby a select few insurance
regulators are able to engineer methods by which the NAIC can usurp
legislative and judicial powers of the states by expending existing NAIC
regulatory vehicles to impose illegal and unconstitutional regulatory
jurisdiction and requirements upon the insurance industry in all fifty states –
without the benefits of any state or federal oversight or legislative action.”
S. Roy Woodall, Jr., The NAIC and “National Regulation,” Editorial,
National Association of Life Companies Newsletter (1991). More recently,
Congressman Ed Royce has suggested during oral comments in several
congressional hearings that the NAIC has usurped state authority by making
regulatory policy without any effective oversight by the states or other public
actors. See Allison Bell, Republican Questions Constitutionality of
Insurance Regulatory System, THINKADVISOR (Oct. 25, 2017, 06:29 AM),
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2017/10/25/republican-questions-constitutio
nality-of-insuranc/?slreturn=20190009212135. Yet a third example of
prominent former or current officials questioning the constitutionality of the
NAIC’s authority comes from former Illinois Insurance Commissioner Nat
Shapo. In oral testimony before a committee of Indiana lawmakers, Shapo
argued that “Dynamic incorporation by reference—implementing material
added to [incorporated by referenced] work product after State’s adoption of
work product through [Incorporation by Reference]—[is] not allowed”
under “state constitutional law” and the non-delegation doctrine. See
Testimony of Nat Shapo, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, before August 16,
2017: Interim Study Committee on Financial Institutions and Insurance. This
issue has also been a frequent topic of conversation at meetings of the
National Conference of Insurance Legislatures. See Ian Adams, At NCOIL,
State Lawmakers Look to Claw Back Power from NAIC, INS. J., (March 6,
2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/right-street/2017/03/06/443
636.htm; Ian Adams, NCOIL, NAIC on Collision Course over
Delegation Authority, INS. J., (July 15, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal
.com/blogs/right-street/2017/07/15/457728.htm).
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accreditation program. It then explores how states delegate power to the
NAIC by incorporating-by-reference the most recent versions of the NAIC’s
materials. It focuses attention on three notable examples of such dynamic
incorporation by reference. The first concerns life insurers’ calculation and
reporting of their reserves, which determine the capital they must set aside
to pay future policyholder claims. Second, Part I describes how the NAIC
directs insurers’ methods and documentation of their corporate risk
management practices. Third, Part I explores how states delegate to the
NAIC the power to set the accounting rules that govern insurers’ copious
financial reporting obligations.
Part II lays the Article’s legal foundation by describing state law
regarding legislative delegations of power to private entities. Although this
law varies across jurisdictions, virtually every state tolerates legislative
delegation of power to private parties only in limited circumstances. States
generally avoid any bright-line rules on this issue, instead utilizing a variety
of overlapping multi-factor tests. Relevant factors include the public or
private character of the delegate, the extent to which the delegate’s authority
is subject to judicial or administrative oversight, and whether the delegate’s
exercise of authority has significance independent of the delegating statute.
Part II explores how these factors play out in two situations that closely
parallel states’ delegation of power to the NAIC: dynamic incorporation by
reference of the American Medical Association’s impairment standards in
state workers’ compensation laws, and state and federal delegations of
authority to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to set
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
Drawing on Parts I and II, Part III explains why states’ delegation of
power to the NAIC violates essential separation of powers and due process
principles embedded in every state constitution. First, Part III argues that the
NAIC is a private entity for purposes of states’ non-delegation doctrines.
Under the formalistic approach to this issue that some courts employ, this
conclusion flows naturally from the fact that the NAIC is chartered as a
Delaware corporation founded by state regulators, rather than state
legislatures.19 But even under the functional approach embraced by other
courts, the NAIC is a private delegate. This is because state legislatures have
limited and fragmented control over the NAIC, a reality that is perhaps best
illustrated by the inability of states legislatures to date to successfully reclaim
their constitutional authority from the NAIC.
The NAIC’s law-making authority is constitutionally problematic
for a second set of reasons as well: it is exempt from dedicated and
19

See infra Section III.
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independent oversight by state judges or administrate bodies. In fact, none
of the NAIC’s alterations to its dynamically-incorporated manuals are
routinely reviewed by any state court or administrative agency.20 State
insurance regulators’ direct participation in the NAIC’s internal processes is
no substitute for such independent oversight. To the contrary, state insurance
regulators operating under the auspices of the NAIC may have substantial
interests in using the NAIC’s delegated authority in ways that promote their
own biased interests. For instance, state insurance regulators may use the
NAIC’s authority to inflate the scope and complexity of the special
accounting principles that U.S. insurers are required to use.21 Doing so can
increase the value of regulators’ specialized insurance expertise, limit the
risk of perceived encroachment on their turf by federal officials, and improve
the NAIC’s capacity to fund its operations by selling new publications or
services. Alternatively, state regulators can, and do, use the NAIC to raise,
pursue, and implement difficult policies in a private forum, away from
democratic accountability.22
To be sure, state statutes do contain provisions allowing state
regulators to depart from dynamically incorporated materials, the most
important factor suggesting that the NAIC’s scheme may be constitutional.
But such departures are not routinely or formally considered by state
insurance departments. Nor could they be, given the relative scope of the
NAIC’s power and the limited resources of most state insurance
departments. Even in the rare instances when an individual state insurance
department departs from a specific NAIC-produced standard, it is in no
position to use this action to influence the NAIC’s operations more broadly.23
The final, and perhaps most important, reason that states’
delegations of powers to the NAIC are generally unconstitutional is that the
NAIC’s exercise of its delegated authority is practically immune from
implicit oversight by state legislatures. This is a result of the NAIC’s unique
Financial Standards and Accreditation Program, which deprives state
lawmakers of any realistic capacity to claw-back their delegations of power
to the NAIC by amending state law.24 As a practical matter, the NAIC uses
the threat of doom of a state’s domestic insurance industry to compel states

20

See infra Section I.
See infra Section III.
22
See infra Section III.
23
See infra Section III.
24
See infra Section I.
21
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to delegate to it immense power over both the details of insurance regulation
and the larger framework within which those details are generated.
Part IV of the Article considers the implications of the conclusion
that much of state insurance regulation rests on an unconstitutional
foundation. It first explores both the positive and negative impacts of simply
eliminating state delegations of power to the NAIC. Although this approach
would increase accountability and decrease bias in the production of state
insurance regulation, it would also undermine the uniformity and agility of
such regulation. For this reason, Part IV concludes by suggesting that states
can constitutionally preserve their delegations of power to the NAIC by
creating, through an interstate compact, an independent entity responsible
for reviewing the production of new NAIC materials that have the force of
law.
I.

STATE DELEGATION OF POWER TO THE NAIC

The NAIC is, in many ways, a unique entity in the American
regulatory landscape. To be sure, as a private organization of public officials,
it resembles any number of other groups, such as the Association of State
and Territorial Health Officials or the Association of State Criminal
Investigative Agencies.25 But unlike any other private association of public
officials, the NAIC is directly responsible for producing many of the
essential details of state regulation. Section A of this Part briefly describes
the NAIC’s history and structure. Section B then describes the NAIC’s
unusual “accreditation” program, which is directly responsible for the
organization’s unique regulatory authority under state law. Section C then
explores three notable state delegations of authority to the NAIC, involving
life insurers’ calculation and reporting of their reserves, insurers’ corporate
risk management practices and reporting, and insurers’ accounting rules.
A.

OVERVIEW OF THE NAIC

The NAIC describes itself as “the U.S. standard-setting and
regulatory support organization created and governed by the chief insurance
regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and five U.S.
25

About, ASS’N OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS,
http://www.astho.org/About/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018); About, ASS’N OF
STATE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES, https://www.ascia.org/about.
php (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
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territories.”26 A group of state insurance commissioners created the
organization in 1871 as an unincorporated association.27 At the time, the
NAIC was focused on facilitating states’ efforts to regulate multistate
insurers by developing a uniform system of financial reporting for these
companies.28 But throughout the twentieth century, the NAIC’s importance
in state insurance regulation gradually increased, with the organization
taking on an increasingly prominent role in crafting model laws and
regulations for states to implement and operating as a forum for dialogue
among state regulators and the insurance industry.29
As the NAIC’s role increased, so did its staff and budget. Run on a
shoestring with a small staff as recently as the 1980s, today the NAIC has
approximately 500 employees spread out over offices in Washington, D.C.,
New York, and Kansas City.30 This staff is supported by a budget of over
$100 million as well as a reserve of an additional $100 million.31
The NAIC sets its own budget without any external oversight. Much
of the NAIC’s revenue comes from its sale of data, reports, and publications
26

About the NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS,
https://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
27
This was shortly after the Supreme Court held in Paul v. Virginia that
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce did not extend to the
business of insurance. 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
28
KENNETH MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE
CASE OF INSURANCE 54 (1988).
29
See Randall, supra note 2, at 648. One watershed moment in the
NAIC’s evolution was its rile in coordinating states’ response to United
States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, which overruled Paul v Virginia by
holding that the deferral government could indeed regulate the business of
insurance under its Commerce Clause power. 322 U.S. 533 (1994). The case
generated substantial concern among states worried about federal
encroachment on the regulation and taxation of insurance as well as among
insurers concerns about a new source of federal scrutiny. The NAIC
ultimately played a major role in proposing the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
which cemented the states’ authority to regulate the business of insurance
and remains the central law in U.S. regulations.
30
See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2018 NAIC BUDGET 25 (2018),
https://www.naic.org/documents/about_budget_2018_budget.pdf?13;
About the NAIC, supra note 15.
31
See supra note 19.
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to the insurance industry. For instance, the NAIC’s leading source of revenue
is its provision of valuation services, which instruct insurers how to value
their investments for regulatory reporting purposes.32 Other major
contributors to the NAIC’s budget include the sale of publications and
insurance data products, transaction filing fees, and its administrative
services and license fees, all of which ultimately come out of the pocket of
insurance industry members.33 Although state insurance regulators cannot
compel insurers to pay these NAIC fees, they can informally pressure
carriers to do so by threatening negative treatment of noncompliant carriers.
Among the publications that the NAIC sells to the industry are the very
manuals that are dynamically incorporated by reference into state law.34
32

The NAIC charges the largest subset of individual carriers $36,000
annually for full access to this database, and ultimately earns approximately
$26 million annually in connection with this service. The NAIC earns a
roughly similar amount annually from the fees that it charges to insurers for
filing their required quarterly and annual statements with the NAIC’s central
data collection system. This includes NAIC designation and review date,
pricing, SIC code, SVO group code, and market indicator. NAT’L ASS’N OF
INS. COMM’RS, Supra note 19, at 2.
33
Id. Although the NAIC does charge its individual members – who
consist of the fifty-six state insurance commissioners – an assessment fee,
total revenue from this source only comes in at about 2% of the NAIC’s
annual budget. See id.
34
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standard in Public Law:
Copyright, Lawmaking, and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291
(2005) (considering whether such materials are entitled to copyright). The
NAIC also derives approximately a quarter of its budget from various vendor
service units. Both directly and through its controlled corporate affiliate
NIPR, the NAIC collects over $25 million annually from its business units
which sell their services to the public offices of the same insurance
commissioners who are its members and who are the beneficiaries of
significant largesse from the NAIC’s expenditure of its $100 million budget.
This includes annual commissioner-only junkets to resorts in tropical
locations like the Virgin Islands every February, and prime domestic
locations like Laguna Beach and Coeur d’Alene every July. The NAIC,
capitalizing on state budget crunches in the last 20 years, has formed several
vendors that serve as a portal for almost all agent and broker licensing
transactions, most rate and form filings, billions in premium tax payments,
and various other regulatory functions. The NAIC explicitly competes with
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Since 1999, the NAIC has been organized as a non-profit
corporation that is governed by an Executive Committee consisting of
seventeen state insurance commissioners. This Executive Committee is
elected by the NAIC’s membership, which consists of the chief state
government official in charge of regulating the business of insurance in each
state, as well as six additional U.S. jurisdictions.35 The NAIC’s day-to-day
operations are directed by its Chief Executive Officer and senior
management, who are hired and overseen by the Executive Committee.
As a private non-profit corporation, the NAIC is not subject to any
state or federal government accountability laws, such as Freedom of
Information Acts, Sunshine Acts, Inspectors General requirements, or state
Conflict of Interest rules.36 However, the NAIC does maintain a number of
self-imposed policies and practices that overlap with the typical content of
these laws. For instance, all NAIC members are required to sign a conflictprivate vendors for the no-bid contracts that it receives from its members,
and in fact was forced to pay a $1.5 million settlement to a vendor which
accused it of predatory behavior, including price fixing. Trade press and a
key Congressman have argued that these activities violate a host of state
ethics laws, but without a day-to-day supervisor and without any
investigative reporters assigned to the NAIC beat, no efforts at accountability
have been made.
35
See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (2015).
36
For one example of how this plays out, consider the industry-aggregate
data that the NAIC’s Auto Insurance Study Group recently collected in
connection with its charge to study auto insurance affordability and
availability. The NAIC has refused to make this data publicly available, even
though it is similar to data reported by the statistical agents to state insurance
regulators, which is publicly available. See Comments of CFA and CEJ to
Auto Insurance Working Group Regarding the August 10, 2018 Draft
“Report” Outline (Sept. 1, 2018)(on file with the CEJ) (“By providing the
data to the NAIC instead of the states, somehow clearly public information
has, inappropriately, become confidential information because the NAIC –
despite its quasi-governmental role – is not subject to any state or federal
public information law. The NAIC’s refusal to make public the data
submitted by industry adds fuel to the complaint that the NAIC is
unaccountable to legislators and consumers who are impacted by NAIC
actions.”).
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of-interest policy that requires them to “avoid any activity or situation where
their personal interest could conflict, or give the appearance of a conflict,
with the business operations or regulatory support activities of the NAIC.” 37
The NAIC organizes much of its activity through an elaborate series
of committees and sub-committees. These committees are typically staffed
by a group of volunteer state insurance regulators, who are heavily supported
by NAIC staff.38 All changes to model laws and regulations are conducted
through this committee structure.39 Changes to the statutorily-referenced
materials, such as handbooks and guides, are also conducted through the
NAIC’s committee structure, with different committees being charged with
maintaining and updating different documents.40
Industry has substantial sway over the NAIC’s operations and
practices, a fact that is most obviously visible at the organization’s three
annual meetings. Under the NAIC’s open meeting policy, almost all of the
organization’s meetings – both in person and via teleconference – are open
37

Although the policy extends to promised offers of future employment,
it is commonplace for NAIC members to take high-profile industry lobbying
positions shortly after being members of NAIC leadership. In at least some
of these cases, individuals have represented the industry in front of the same
committees that they chaired as an NAIC officer only months earlier. See,
e.g., Csiszar Named President of PCI; Resigns as S.C. Insurance Regulator,
President of NAIC, INS. J. (Aug. 18, 2004), https://www.insurancejournal.co
m/news/national/2004/08/18/45061.htm.
38
See Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer
Empowerment Programs, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 365, 365-96 (David A Moss &
Daniel Carpenter eds., 2013).
39
In 2007, the NAIC adopted an internal procedure for model law
development, which requires that a parent committee and the NAIC’s
Executive Committee approve development of the model, as well as the final
version of the model, by two-thirds majority vote. See PROCEDURES FOR
MODEL LAW DEV. (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2013). (2007), https://
www.naic.org/documents/committees_models_procedures.pdf.
40
See, e.g., Statutory Accounting Principles (E) Working Group, NAT’L
ASS’N INS. COMM'RS, https://www.naic.org/cmte_e_app_sapwg.htm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2019) (“The Statutory Accounting Principles (E) Working
Group is responsible for developing and adopting substantive,
nonsubstantive and interpretation revisions to the NAIC Accounting
Practices and Procedures Manual (AP&P Manual”)) (emphasis in original).
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to the industry and other members of the public.41 A typical in-person
committee meeting might consist of around 20 committee members seated
at the front of the room, with approximately 200 spectators in the audience,
almost all of whom are representing the industry in some fashion. The NAIC
derives meaningful revenue from industry participation in its annual
meetings, amounting to approximately $3 million annually.42 Private parties
routinely participate actively in committee meetings through the submission
of oral and written comments and reports as well as through formal
presentations. To help offset this industry influence, the NAIC operates a
formal consumer participation program, which facilitates participation in its
activities by approximately twenty designated consumer liaisons.43
B.

THE NAIC’S FINANCIAL STANDARDS AND ACCREDITATION
PROGRAM

Individual states need not adopt the NAIC’s model laws, and they
often choose not to do so when it comes to NAIC models having nothing to
do with financial regulation. However, states do indeed uniformly enact the
subset of NAIC model laws that are required under the NAIC’s Financial
Standards and Accreditation Program.44 This program certifies that
individual state departments’ solvency regulation meets minimum standards,
which requires the department to have “adequate statutory and
administrative authority.”45 For an insurance department to be deemed to
have adequate legal authority under the program, its state must adopt the
subset of NAIC model laws that are accreditation standards, or else they must
adopt laws with “substantially similar provisions.”46
41

NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS, NAIC POLICY STATEMENT
ON OPEN MEETINGS (2014), https://www.naic.org/documents/meetings_nai
c_policy_mtg_801.pdf. However, the NAIC reserves the right to hold closed
meetings on a regulator-to-regulator basis for a broad variety of reasons. Id.
42
See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 30.
43
See Schwarcz, supra note 38.
44
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2.
45
NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, FINANCIAL REGULATION
STANDARDS AND ACCREDITATION PROGRAM 1, 1–17 (2018), https://www.
naic.org/documents/cmte_f_frsa_pamphlet.pdf
[hereinafter
“NAIC
Accreditation Standards”].
46
Id. at 9.
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States face little practical choice but to adopt the NAIC accreditation
standards because failing to do so would result in a substantial reduction in
their tax revenue and jobs. Within the various model laws that states must
adopt under the accreditation program are provisions allowing state
insurance departments to defer to the solvency regulation of an insurer’s state
of domestication,47 but only if that state’s insurance department is accredited.
As a result, insurers operating in multiple states will predictably shift their
state of domestication out of a state that lost its NAIC accreditation, because
failing to do so would result in it being subject to solvency-oriented scrutiny
in every state where it sold coverage. To accomplish such a redomestication,
insurers must generally re-designate their “principal place of business” to the
new state of domestication.48 Consequently, a state that lost its NAIC
accreditation would also lose the jobs and tax revenue associated with its
domesticated insurers. State legislatures, of course, have strong reasons to
avoid this outcome.
One recent presentation to New Mexico’s Legislative Council by the
Chief General Counsel of the New Mexico insurance department is
illustrative of the pressure the NAIC accreditation program places on state
legislatures. In explaining why, the New Mexico legislature needed to
promptly adopt the NAIC’s ORSA Model Law – a new accreditation
standard – the presentation observes:
The NAIC requires enactment of this bill in order for OSI [the Office
of Superintendent of Insurance in New Mexico] to maintain its accreditation
with the NAIC: If OSI loses its accreditation, New Mexico insurers that write
in other states would have to undergo costly and disruptive examinations by
the insurance departments of each state in which they write. This could cause
insurers to leave New Mexico and to domicile in another state, resulting in
the loss of jobs and tax revenues. Since all 50 states are currently accredited,
New Mexico's loss of accreditation would be a national embarrassment and
would lend support to efforts to shift insurance regulation to the federal
government with a resulting loss in state control and revenues.49
47

Technically this is referred to as the insurer’s state of domicile, and it
is analogous to a corporation’s state of incorporation.
48
See NAIC, Redomestication Model Bill, Model 350.
49
Vicente Vargas & Margaret Moquin, Presentation to the New Mexico
Legislative Council Service: Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (Sept. 12,
2017), https://www.nmlegis.gov/handouts/CCJ%20091217%20Item%204
%20Own%20Risk%20and%20Solvency%20Assesment,%20Office%20of
%20Superintendent%20of%20Insurance.pdf.
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The immense pressure that the NAIC’s accreditation program places
on states is intentional. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, state solvency
regulation was subject to blistering criticism at the federal level due to
several high-profile insurance insolvencies. A series of federal reports
concluded that state insurance solvency regulation was “seriously
deficient”50 and that the NAIC could not compel states to enact needed
reforms.51 The NAIC’s accreditation program was directly designed to
overcome these problems. It did so, of course, by effectively threatening to
regulate into oblivion the insurers of any state that chose not to adhere to the
NAIC’s new program.
C.

STATE DELEGATIONS TO THE NAIC

States delegate a tremendous amount of authority over insurance
regulation to the NAIC due to their insurance codes’ incorporation by
reference of the latest versions of NAIC materials. One recent count
identified seventeen such NAIC-produced documents that were dynamically
incorporated by reference in Indiana’s statutes.52 A substantial majority of
these documents are required by the NAIC’s accreditation standards,
meaning that they are dynamically incorporated by reference under the laws
of every U.S. jurisdiction.53 Although the scope and significance of these
NAIC-produced documents varies considerably, many are hundreds of pages
long and control central elements of state insurance regulation. By way of
example, this Section reviews three significant state delegations of authority
to the NAIC, which govern insurers’ calculation and reporting of their

50

COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., REP ON
INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES (Comm. Print 1990).
51
GAO REPORT, INSURANCE REGULATION: ASSESSMENT OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (1991) (“For
several reasons, GAO questions whether NAIC’s accreditation program can
achieve its goal…. NAIC does not have the authority necessary to fulfill its
assumed role as a national regulator. As a result, NAIC is unlikely to achieve
its stated goal of establishing a national insurance regulatory system. It can
neither compel state actions necessary for effective regulation nor, in the
long run, can it sustain its reforms.”).
52
See note 5, supra.
53
See NAIC ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 30.
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reserves, methods and documentation of corporate risk management, and
accounting rules.
1. Dynamic Incorporation by Reference of the NAIC’s
Valuation Manual
Perhaps the most significant state delegation of power to the NAIC
stems from states’ dynamic incorporation-by-reference of the NAIC’s
Valuation Manual. With a small handful of exceptions, the law of every state
in the country includes language identical or substantially similar to the
NAIC’s 2009 Model Standard Valuation Law (SVL), which dynamically
incorporates by reference the NAIC’s Valuation Manual.54 The Valuation
Manual, in turn, governs every facet of life insurers’ calculation and
reporting of their “reserves.”55
Rules governing life insurers’ reserve calculations are among the
most important elements of state solvency regulation. Reserves correspond
to the amount that insurers must “set aside” on their balance sheet in
anticipation of future payouts to insurance policyholders.56 They operate as
the foundation for many other core regulatory tools, the most important of
which are capital requirements.57 Reserve calculations are particularly
important for long-tail lines of coverage like life insurance, where there is
typically a substantial time gap between when a policyholder pays premiums
and when they potentially receive payment on their claims.58 If insurers are
not forced to properly account for their obligations in the distant future, then
they may well not be able to pay for those claims when they come due.
The SVL model and the state statutes emulating it do contain some
principles regarding the scope of the Valuation Manual and the process that
the NAIC must follow to amend the manual. For instance, they indicate that
the Valuation Manual should specify the format of reports, information, and
data that insurers must submit to state regulators; the assumptions that
insurers must use in their reserve modeling; and the procedures that insurers
must maintain for corporate governance and oversight of the actuaries who

54

NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, STANDARD VALUATION LAW § 11
(2010).
55
Id.
56
See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 121-22.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 292.
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develop the reserve models.59 Additionally, state laws based on the NAIC
model SVL provide that individual state commissioners can implement
regulations requiring insurers to use procedures that depart from those
contained in the model.60 They also provide that the NAIC can only amend
the model via a super-majority vote of its fifty-six voting members.61
The latest version of the NAIC’s Valuation Manual – last amended
in August of 2017 – clocks in at 295 pages and includes detailed and
extensive provisions on virtually every element of insurers’ reserve
calculation. It is organized into five sections. The primary section details
how insurers must calculate their reserves using projected asset and liability
cash flows across a range of economic scenarios.62 These projections must
incorporate insurers’ assumptions about factors such as policyholder
mortality, policyholder behavior, and expenses. Insurers are also required by
the Valuation Manual to calculate a minimum reserve amount, which is
intended to prevent excessively low reserves. The other four sections of the
Valuation Manual govern procedural and reporting requirements for
insurers. For instance, they require insurers to submit to regulators actuarial
opinions regarding the adequacy of reserves as well as reams of data
regarding the carriers’ mortality, morbidity, policyholder behavior, and
expense experience.63
Almost every state passed the NAIC’s updated SVL model well
before the NAIC published this latest version of its Valuation Manual,
meaning that these states delegated authority to the NAIC which it actually
59

Standard Valuation Law § 11 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2010).
In addition to life insurance contracts, the SVL also applies to annuity and
pure endowment contracts, accident and health contracts, and deposit
contracts issued on or after the operative date of the Valuation Manual.
60
Id. The Commissioner is also authorized to require a company to
change an assumption or method if the Commissioner determines it is not in
compliance with the Act or the Valuation Manual.
61
Memorandum from the Life Actuarial (A) Task Force, Nat’l Ass’n of
Ins. Comm’rs, to the Fin. Regulation Standards and Accreditation (F)
Comm., Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.naic.org/
documents/cmte_f_pbr_referal_2009_revisions_standard_valuation_law_8
20.pdf [hereinafter Task Force Memorandum].
62
NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, VALUATION MANUAL (2018).
63
Id. Under the Valuation Manual, the NAIC itself is the experience data
collection agent.
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used. In fact, many states passed the NAIC’s model SVL law between 2009,
when it was finalized, and late 2012, when the NAIC published the first
version of the Valuation Manual.64 States that passed the NAIC’s SVL model
after the NAIC first published the Valuation Manual in 2012 but before the
NAIC’s latest update of the manual in August 2017 – a category which
includes almost all of the states that did not pass the model before late 201265
– also delegated authority to the NAIC that it used extensively. Between
2015 and 2017, the NAIC has adopted over fifty different amendments to the
valuation manual at five different times.66

64

The NAIC model and corresponding state statutes allowed states to
incorporate a then-undrafted Valuation Manual by providing that insurers’
reserve calculations would only be governed by the manual when two
conditions were met. First, the NAIC model and the statutes on which it is
based required a super-majority of the NAIC’s fifty-six voting members to
approve the Valuation Manual. Second, it required a supermajority of U.S.
insurance jurisdictions to adopt legislation implementing the SVL revisions.
In June 2016, the NAIC certified that these conditions had been met. First,
between 2009 and 2016, forty-five states, representing 79.5% of U.S.
premium volume, had adopted the 2009 NAIC model revisions to their SVLs
or legislation with substantially similar terms and provisions. Second, the
NAIC formally adopted the first version of the Valuation Manual in
December 2012, and subsequently adopted over fifty different amendments
to the Valuation Manual at five different times between 2015 and 2017. As
a result of these conditions being met, the Valuation Manual is now law in
almost every U.S. state. Starting in 2017, a three-year trial phase of PBR –
during which the Valuation Manual is optional for insurers – went into effect
in all states that had passed the model legislation. The trial phase for
implementation was established in the manual itself, rather than in the SVL
revisions. At the start of 2020, PBR will become fully effective and the
Valuation Manual will dictate insurers’ reserve practices in all states that
have passed the model law. See Task Force Memorandum, supra note 42.
65
Meanwhile, forty-five of the fifty-one jurisdictions that have adopted
the NAIC’s SVL did so by the end of 2016, before the latest round of NAIC
revisions to the Valuation Manual. Id.
66
See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, VALUATION MANUAL at i (2018),
https://www.naic.org/documents/prod_serv_2018_valuation_manual.pdf
(listing amendments through 2016: “The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) initially adopted the Valuation Manual on Dec. 2,
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States have almost uniformly passed the NAIC’s model SVL law
notwithstanding that the Valuation Manual that it incorporates into state law
represents a fundamental change in the character of state solvency
regulation. Historically, states required life insurers to use mechanical and
relatively simple formulas to calculate their reserves. This approach,
however, created a variety of complications due to the increasing
heterogeneity and complexity of life insurers’ products.67 Starting shortly
before the 2008 financial crisis, state regulators organizing through the
NAIC responded to these concerns by launching a Principles-Based
Reserving (PBR) initiative.68 The core idea of PBR was to replace the
mechanical rules governing insurers’ reserve calculations with a system that
allowed insurers to calculate their future obligations to policyholders based
on internal, company-specific models. Rather than checking the accuracy of
insurers’ mechanical calculations, state regulators in this regime would
ensure that firms’ internal models complied with a range of broad principles,
technical specifications, and procedural requirements. The SVL model and
Valuation Manual implement this new PBR regime.
States’ uniform passage of the NAIC SVL model is largely
attributable to NAIC pressure via the accreditation program. Starting in early
2010, an NAIC committee recommended including the 2009 revisions to the
NAIC’s SVL model in the NAIC’s accreditation standards.69 After years of
delay and debate, the NAIC ultimately adopted this suggestion in 2016, but
delayed its implementation until January 2020.70 At present only five
jurisdictions have not passed the latest version of the SVL law, and it is
2012, with subsequent adoptions of amendments on June 18, 2015; Nov. 22,
1015 [sic]; April 6, 2016; Aug. 29, 2016; and Aug. 9, 2017.”).
67
Robert F. Weber, Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance
Solvency Regulation: The Case for a Meta-Risk Management Approach to
Principles-Based Reserving, 8 BERKLEY BUS. L.J. 35, 105-15 (2011).
68
This timing is notable. A similar principles-based approach to
calculating capital requirements proved disastrous in the crisis, but by the
time this became clear, the PBR initiative was already quite far along. See
Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in
Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569 (2014).
69
See Task Force Memorandum, supra note 61.
70
The National System of State Regulation and Principle-Based
Reserving, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS (July 12, 2018),
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/principle_based_reserving_pbr.htm.
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widely expected that these holdouts will succumb to NAIC pressure by
2020.71
NAIC staff have played a central role in the implementation of PBR
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. For instance, the NAIC
maintains substantial actuarial staff to assist state regulators in reviewing
individual companies’ reserve calculations and documentation. It created a
standing Valuation Analysis (E) Working Group to serve as a “confidential
forum regarding questions and issues arising during the course of annual
principle-based reserving (PBR) reviews or PBR examination” and to refer
issues that may require “consideration of changes/interpretations to be
provided in the Valuation Manual.”72
2. Dynamic Incorporation by Reference of the Own Risk
and Solvency Assessment Manual
State statutory references to the NAIC’s “Own Risk and Solvency
Assessment Manual” (“ORSA Manual”) constitute a second type of state
delegation of power to the NAIC. These statutory cross-references derive
from the NAIC’s Risk Management and Own Risk Solvency Assessment
Model Act (“ORSA Model Act”), which the NAIC formally adopted in
2012.73 The Act specifies that changes made by the NAIC to the ORSA
Manual are effective starting in the calendar year after adoption.74 Since the
NAIC designated the Model Act as an accreditation standard, every single
state (except one) has adopted the model or a statute with substantially
similar language as of March 2018.75

71

As of today, fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions have passed these revisions;
The five that have not are New York, Alaska, Massachusetts, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. See Task Force Memorandum, supra note 61.
72
Valuation Analysis (E) Working Group, 2018 Charges, NAT’L ASS’N
INS. COMM’RS, https://www.naic.org/cmte_e_valuation_analysis_wg.htm
(last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
73
RISK MGMT. & OWN RISK & SOLVENCY ASSESSMENT MODEL ACT
(NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2012).
74
Id. § 2.
75
See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, STATE LEGISLATIVE BRIEF: THE
RISK MANAGEMENT AND OWN RISK SOLVENCY ASSESSMENT MODEL ACT
(2018), https://www.naic.org/documents/cmte_legislative_liaison_brief_ors
a.pdf.
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The ORSA Model Act requires large insurers to maintain an
enterprise risk management framework based on the latest version of the
NAIC’s ORSA Manual. Carriers subject to the Act must regularly assess
their risk management framework “consistent with a process comparable to”
the NAIC’s ORSA Manual.76 To document their compliance with the risk
management processes outlined in the ORSA Manual, insurers covered by
the Act are required to annually produce an ORSA summary report. The Act
provides that this ORSA summary report – like the ORSA itself and the other
required documentation – “shall be prepared consistent with the ORSA
Guidance Manual.”77
The ORSA Model Act does not provide the NAIC with any direction
about the process or substance of the ORSA Manual. For instance, it does
not contain any substantive guidance on how the NAIC should craft the
standards within the ORSA Manual, aside from the implicit suggestion that
the manual should cover appropriate risk management practices for insurers.
Nor does the Model Act specify any procedure for the NAIC to follow in
adopting or revising the manual.
The NAIC adopted the latest version of its ORSA Manual in late
2017.78 The manual contains a variety of directions to insurers regarding the
content, procedures, and documentation of their required risk management
practices. For instance, it specifies that insurers must assess and document
their Risk Culture and Governance, Risk Identification and Prioritization,
Risk Appetite, Tolerances and Limits, Risk Management and Controls, and
Risk Reporting and Communication.79
One of the most important elements of the manual requires insurers
to report a “group risk capital assessment” in their ORSA summary report.80
76

Risk Management and Own Risk and Solvency Assessment Model
Act § 4 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2012).
77
Id. § 7(A). In addition, “[d]ocumentation and supporting information
shall be maintained” and shall be made available to the commissioner upon
the commissioner’s request. Id.
78
See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, NAIC OWN RISK AND SOLVENCY
ASSESSMENT (ORSA) GUIDANCE MANUAL, at iii (2017).
79
Id. at 8.
80
Id. at 10–11 (“The analysis of an insurer’s group assessment of risk
capital requirements and associated capital adequacy description should be
accompanied by a description of the approach used in conducting the
analysis. This should include key methodologies, assumptions and
considerations used in quantifying available capital and risk capital.”).
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In contrast to the ordinary capital rules that states apply to individual
insurance entities, the ORSA Manual’s direction for group capital
calculations provide insurers with substantial latitude in their calculations.
Under the manual, insurers are allowed to select their own methodologies
and assumptions for calculating their group capital, so long as they describe
and explain their approach.
The ORSA Manual’s latitude in specifying how insurers should
calculate their group capital may change soon. Many foreign regulators have
expressed concern about state insurance regulators’ lack of a standardized
group capital requirement, and states have responded by developing a variety
of much more specific principles for group capital calculations. State
regulators have emphasized, however, that they do not plan to implement
this new group capital methodology as an independent quantitative
requirement, but instead intend to use it solely as an “additional regulatory
assessment tool.”81 This strongly suggests that state regulators may
implement their new group capital methodology simply by amending the
ORSA Manual rather than by establishing a new group capital model law or
regulation.
New changes to the ORSA Manual’s group capital rules would not
be the first NAIC update of the manual. While the NAIC first adopted the
ORSA Manual in 2014, it subsequently amended the manual in 2017. The
most important changes to the manual created a process for the NAIC to
update the manual in the future. Those procedures designated a specific
NAIC group as being responsible for updating the manual and contained no
requirement that NAIC members as a whole approve changes to the
document.
3. Dynamic Incorporation by Reference of the Accounting
Practices and Procedures Manual
A third example of state delegation to the NAIC via dynamic
incorporation by reference concerns insurers’ accounting practices. Every
state requires by statute that insurers report their financial information to
insurance regulators using a unique set of insurance-specific accounting

81

See, e.g., David Altmaier, Group Capital Calculation, NAIC (2018),
https://www.naic.org/insurance_summit/documents/insurance_summit_201
8_FR_22.pdf.
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rules known as Statutory Accounting Principles (“SAP”).82 Although these
accounting rules are termed “statutory,” they are not, in fact, contained in
any state statute. Instead, they are detailed in the voluminous, multi-volume,
NAIC Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual (AP&P Manual), the
latest version of which state laws incorporate by reference. As with the
Valuation Manual and ORSA Manual, the NAIC’s accreditation program
requires this delegation of authority to the NAIC as a condition for states to
maintain their financial accreditation.83 This, of course, explains why states
82

The history of the AP&P Manual demonstrates the NAIC’s intentional
use of the incorporation by reference process to establish itself as a body with
pseudo-Congressional power to pass laws for the entire country. Before
2000, the NAIC published a series of Accounting Practices and Procedures
Manuals, slim volumes for each different line of insurance, housed in loose
leaf binders which allowed for updating. The title of these manuals was
incorporated by reference in state statutes, mandating the use of the statutory
accounting regime they established. During the 1990s, NAIC members
concluded that a full, comprehensive rewrite of the accounting manual was
necessary to establish a uniform national regulatory requirement for
accounting practices. The new work product was massive. Including
subsequent amendments, this amounted to over 1,000 pages of new material.
See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, CODIFICATION OF STATUTORY
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES STATE IMPLEMENTATION (2000). The NAIC
intentionally gave the new manual the same name as the already incorporated
by reference accounting manuals, so that, it asserted, the new AP&P Manual
would automatically become the law upon NAIC adoption. NAIC members
faithfully followed this guidance, sending out bulletins to regulated entities,
explaining that a sea change was being made to their accounting
requirements, not by lawmaking in their states, but by the decree of the NAIC
through the incorporation by reference mechanism; and further explaining
that NAIC intended to make changes every year to the Manual which would
also automatically become new law in each state. See id.
83
Unlike the valuation and ORSA documents, the NAIC does not
maintain a model law or regulation that broadly requires this delegation,
though several model laws do indeed dynamically incorporate by reference
the AP&P Manual in a narrower context. See, e.g., INVS. OF INSURERS
MODEL ACT § 7 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2017). Instead, the NAIC’s
Accreditation program directly requires that states mandate companies
follow the AP&P Manual, without specifying how exactly they must
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have so uniformly delegated to the NAIC the power to set the accounting
rules that bind insurers through the AP&P Manual.
The AP&P Manual is voluminous, but – unlike the NAIC’s
Valuation or ORSA manuals – it is not freely available to the public. Instead,
each user must pay approximately $500 to access the manual.84 The manual
covers an immense range of insurance-specific accounting and reporting
rules, as suggested by the fact that its table of contents alone is fifteen pages
long. Examples of topics covered include the subset of assets that insurers
can include on their balance sheets, the proper accounting treatment of
anticipated premiums tax benefits, and the accounting treatment of
reinsurance transactions.
The special accounting rules detailed in the AP&P Manual are
ostensibly intended to better reflect the capacity of insurers to pay their
commitments to policyholders if they had to be liquidated, in contrast to
GAAP’s focus on facilitating outsiders’ assessments of a firm’s market
value.85 Reflecting SAP’s conservatism relative to GAAP, the AP&P manual
is often substantially more prescriptive than GAAP. For instance, SAP
requires property/casualty insurers to value high-quality bonds at amortized
cost rather than market value, whereas GAAP allows insurers to select
between these two approaches depending on their anticipated plans for the
bonds.86 Similarly, SAP only allows insurers to include on their balance
sheets admitted assets, which can be readily converted to cash.87

accomplish this result. See NAIC ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note
45, at 9 (“The department should require that all companies reporting to the
department file the appropriate NAIC annual statement blank, which should
be prepared in accordance with the NAIC’s instructions handbook and
follow those accounting procedures and practices prescribed by the NAIC’s
Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual, utilizing the version effective
January 1, 2001 and all subsequent revisions adopted by the Financial
Regulation Standards and Accreditation (F) Committee.”).
84
See Cunningham, supra note 34, at 292-93 (considering when private
publications that operate as law should be made freely available to the
public).
85
See Weber, supra note 67, at 53–63.
86
See Background on: Insurance Accounting, INS. INFO. INST. (Mar. 3,
2014), https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-insurance-accounting.
87
Id.
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The manual is routinely updated by the NAIC’s Statutory
Accounting Principles (E) Working Group.88 The Working Group considers
whether each new GAAP item should be adopted or adjusted for insurance
in the AP&P Manual.89 It also maintains a public tool for anyone to propose
items to be updated in the manual.90 By way of illustration, the working
group recently considered twenty-seven different proposed revisions to the
AP&P Manual and it regularly adopts dozens of revisions to the manual each
year.
Notwithstanding state mandates that carriers comply with the latest
version of the AP&P Manual, individual states have the authority to depart
from the AP&P Manual in two scenarios. First, states can adopt via statute
or regulation “Prescribed Accounting Practices” that alter SAP rules for all
insurers domiciled in the state. Second, the manual also authorizes state
regulators to allow “Permitted Accounting Practices” for individual insurers
who request approval for departures from SAP.91 In either case, insurers must
disclose their reliance on these exceptions from SAP in their financial
statements.
II.

THE LAW GOVERNING STATE LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION
OF POWERS TO PRIVATE ACTORS

Just like the federal constitution, every state constitution vests an
independent branch of state government with the legislative power. And just
like the federal constitution, a corollary of this principle is that the legislature
has limited authority to delegate this power elsewhere. Legislative
delegations of power to a private actor, as opposed to a government agency,
are particularly troubling, as they implicate not just separation of powers
principles, but also more fundamental due process concerns.
88

For instance, the initial Codification of SAP in 2001 imposed an initial
73 Statements of Statutory Accounting Principles upon regulated companies.
As of today, the number of SSAPs has grown to 10,757.
89
See Deborah L. Lindberg & Deborah L. Seifert, A New Paradigm of
Reporting on the Horizon, 29 J. INS. REG. 229, 242 (2010).
90
Statutory Accounting Principles € Working Group, NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMM'RS, https://naic.org/cmte_e_app_sapwg.htm (last visited Aug. 26,
2018).
91
Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP), NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM'RS,
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_statutory_accounting_principles.ht
m (last visited Jan. 6, 2019).
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For these reasons, state courts from across the country have
invalidated a broad range of legislative delegations to private parties. In
doing so, they generally employ what amounts to a multi-factor balancing
test that considers (i) the public or private status of the delegate, (ii) oversight
of the delegate by public bodies such as the judiciary or a public agency, and
(iii) the delegate’s independence from the lawmaking function.
This Part overviews this caselaw, abstracting away from the law of
any individual state to derive and illustrate the general principles that
influence state court scrutiny of legislative delegations to private actors.
After briefly reviewing states’ generalized non-delegation doctrines in
Section A, Section B explores why state delegations to private parties raise
distinctive issues. Section C then distills the relevant factors that state courts
consider in assessing the constitutionality of delegations to private actors.
Finally, Section D illustrates the application of these principles in two
contexts that resemble the states’ delegation of power to the NAIC: state
incorporation of American Medical Association standards in workers’
compensation statutes, and state and federal delegations of authority to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board to set accounting rules for private
entitles.
A.

STATES’ NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINES

The non-delegation doctrine limits legislatures’ constitutional
authority to delegate their powers to third parties.92 It is typically rooted in
separation of powers principles.93 Consistent with this foundation, the vast
majority of non-delegation cases concern legislative delegations to executive
agencies, courts, or other governmental entities.94

92

See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV.
327, 335–43 (2002).
93
See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1167, 1190 (1999). Contra Joseph Postell, “The People Surrender
Nothing”: Social Compact Theory, Republicanism, and the Modern
Administrative State, 81 MO. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (2016) (“[T]he true
foundation of the nondelegation principle is the idea of the social compact
and the related theory of republican government.”).
94
Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine:
Alive and Well, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619, 641 (2017).
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Although the non-delegation doctrine is virtually a dead letter in
federal jurisprudence,95 it is quite robust in state courts.96 Indeed, between
1940 and 2015, 85% of all non-delegation cases were decided by state, rather
than federal, courts.97 Parties seeking to invalidate a statutory delegation of
power in these cases enjoyed a 16% success rate, which stands in stark
contrast to the 3% success rate that their counterparts experienced in federal
courts over the same time period.98
Unlike the federal constitution – which is silent on the topic of nondelegation – most state constitutions directly limit legislatures’ powers to
delegate their law-making authority.99 These constitutional provisions come
in three basic varieties. Some expressly prohibit any branch of government
from exercising another’s powers.100 Other state constitutions prohibit the
legislature from “making the passage of any law contingent upon any event
or outside authority.”101 A third type of constitutional provision “explicitly

95

See Rossi, supra note 93, at 1178; Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies,
and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 443, 452 (2014) (calling the federal nondelegation doctrine “toothless”).
96
See generally Rossi, supra note 93, at 1187–1201 (surveying state
nondelegation doctrine and classifying states’ approaches as “weak,”
“strong,” or “moderate”); Iuliano & Whittington, supra note 94, at 620
(“[D]espite the doctrine’s disappearance at the federal level, it has become
an increasingly important part of state constitutional law.”).
97
Iuliano & Whittington, supra note 94, at 636. This survey examined a
sample of 1,075 non-delegation cases decided between 1940 and 2015.
98
Id.
99
Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 416 (2017).
100
Id. at 416. Whittington and Iuliano cite the Texas constitution as
representative: “The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall
be divided into three distinct departments…and no person, or collection of
persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any powers
properly attached to either of the others.” TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
101
Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 99, at 416. The authors cite
Indiana’s constitution as an example: “No law shall be passed, the taking
effect of which shall be made to depend upon any authority, except as
provided in this Constitution,” IND. CONST. art. I, § 25.

226

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 25

forbids the legislature from delegating any of its powers” to a variety of
actors, including private entities.102
Given this variation in constitutional text, it is no surprise that state
caselaw on the non-delegation doctrine also varies significantly. One
extensive survey grouped states’ approaches to the doctrine into three
categories, though they do not correspond neatly to the three types of state
constitutional provisions on the issue.103 First, some states uphold legislative
delegations when the delegated power is subject to adequate procedural
safeguards.104 Second, a larger group of states requires state legislatures to
articulate substantive standards that constrain the exercise of delegated
power and guide judicial review of the delegate’s actions.105 Finally, a third
group of states employ a balancing test that considers both substantive and
procedural restrictions on delegated power in light of various additional
factors, such as the subject matter of the underlying statute.106

102

Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 99, at 416. The authors cite
Colorado’s constitution as representative: “The general assembly shall not
delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any
power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement,
money, property, or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy
taxes or perform any municipal function whatever,” COLO. CONST. art. V, §
35.
103
Rossi, supra note 93, at 1187-1201. Rossi’s survey “updated and
refined” an earlier survey by Gary Greco. Id. at 1191 n.108 (citing Gary J.
Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the
States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567 (1994)).
104
Rossi, supra note 93, at 1191-93; see e.g., Warren v. Marion Cty.,
353 P.2d 257, 261 (Or. 1960) (in banc) (“[T]he important consideration is
not whether the statute delegating the power expresses standards, but
whether the procedure established for the exercise of the power furnishes
adequate safeguards to those who are affected by the administrative
action.”).
105
Rossi, supra note 93, at 1193-97; see, e.g., Newport Int’l Univ., Inc.
v. Dep’t of Educ., 186 P.3d 382, 390 (Wyo. 2008) (“The crucial test in
determining whether there is an unlawful delegation is whether the statute
contains sufficient standards to enable the agency to act and the courts to
determine whether the agency is carrying out the legislature’s intent.”).
106
Rossi, supra note 93, at 1198-1200; see e.g., Cottrell v. Denver, 636
P.2d 703, 709 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (“[T]he test is not simply whether the
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THE UNIQUE CASE OF LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS TO PRIVATE
PARTIES

Courts at both the federal and state levels have long recognized that
laws delegating legislative authority to private, rather than public, actors
raise unique concerns.107 Perhaps the most well-known articulation of this
view is from the 1936 Supreme Court case Carter v. Carter Coal Co., which
involved a federal law authorizing private coal producers and miners to set
binding wage and hour restrictions.108 In finding the law unconstitutional, the
Court emphasized that it conferred power onto “private persons” rather than
“an official or an official body,” and thus constituted “legislative delegation
in its most obnoxious form.”109 Although federal caselaw building on this
principle is limited, numerous state court decisions have similarly concluded
that many, if not most, “private delegations are unconstitutional under the
relevant state constitutions.”110
State courts’ skepticism toward legislative delegation to private
parties is generally driven just as much by due process and rule of law
concerns as by separation of powers principles.111 Unlike public entities
authorized to exercise legislative powers, like executive agencies or courts,
“private delegates may not be subject to direct political controls nor to due
process, administrative procedure laws, freedom of information laws, or
judicial review.”112 Private entities may also labor under conflicts of interest
that harm their competitors or other private actors.113

delegation is guided by standards, but whether there are sufficient statutory
standards and safeguards and administrative standards and safeguards, in
combination, to protect against unnecessary and uncontrolled exercise of
discretionary power.”).
107
E.g., Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827, 837 (Pa.
2017).
108
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
109
Id. at 311.
110
Calvin R. Massey, The Non-Delegation Doctrine and Private Parties,
17 GREEN BAG 2D 157, 171 (2014).
111
Id. at 167–68.
112
MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 395 (3d. ed. 2009).
113
See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311.
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Despite these concerns, delegation of authority to private entities is
sometimes both necessary and beneficial. State governments lacking
resources or expertise may look to private organizations for regulatory
guidance.114 In some contexts, a need for uniformity across states may drive
legislatures to adopt a national organization’s standards.115 And legislatures
may decide it would be expedient to delegate a degree of regulatory power
to the private parties subject to regulation.116
One of the most common ways in which state legislatures delegate
authority to private actors is by incorporating privately-produced rules or
standards into statutes. Not all statutory references to private entities’
materials implicate the non-delegation doctrine. Statutes that incorporate
pre-existing sources are perfectly innocuous. In such cases, the legislature
has had an opportunity to review and affirmatively adopt the incorporated
standards and the reference operates as a mere legislative short-hand.117
However, when a statute cross-references not just existing materials, but also
prospectively adopts – sight unseen – future changes made by private actors
to incorporated materials, the statute transfers to those actors the capacity to
change the law.118 This is just as much a delegation of legislative power to
private actors as more explicit delegation of the type at issue in Carter Coal.

114

See In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790, 796–97 (Minn. 1978).
See Lucas v. Me. Comm'n of Pharmacy, 472 A.2d 904, 911 (Me.
1984) (noting a need for uniform education standards for pharmacists and
health professionals).
116
See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952
S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997), as supplemented on denial of reh'g (Oct. 9, 1997)
(invalidating a statute designed to give farmers control over an agricultural
pest eradication program).
117
See Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 731 (Md. 1989).
However, some early non-delegation cases suggested that statutes
incorporating another jurisdiction’s laws, even without dynamic
incorporation of changes, were invalid because the practice sidestepped
important legislative processes. See F. Scott Boyd, Looking Glass Law:
Legislation by Reference in the States, 68 LA. L. REV. 1201, 1211–12, 1254–
55 (2008).
118
See Bd. of Trs., 562 A.2d at 731; Boyd, supra note 117, at 1254–57.
115

2018
C.

IS U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

229

KEY FACTORS IN ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS TO PRIVATE ACTORS

Although state legislatures commonly delegate authority to private
organizations, the non-delegation doctrine places limits on the practice.119
State courts have found that a wide variety of delegations to private actors
exceed these limits.120 Just like the state caselaw addressing non-delegation
principles generally,121 the subset of this caselaw focused on delegations to
private parties is varied, both within and across states. State courts have
developed varying and overlapping multi-factor tests for assessing when
legislative delegations of power to private actors are constitutionally
permissible,122 and some have even suggested that all delegations of power
to private entities are unconstitutional.123 This subsection distills from this
caselaw several of the most important factors124 that influence state courts’
119

See generally Boyd, supra note 117, at 1251–60 (discussing the nondelegation doctrine as a constraint on incorporation by reference); Tex. Boll
Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 465–69, 471–72.
120
See, e.g., Gumbhir v. Kan. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 618 P.2d 837 (Kan.
1980) (university accreditation); Hillman v. N. Wasco Cty. People’s Util.
Dist., 323 P.2d 664, 670 (Or. 1958) (state electrical code), overruled on other
grounds by Maulding v. Clackamas Cty., 563 P.2d 731 (Or. 1977); Protz v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017) (workers’
compensation); Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d 454 (pest-control program).
121
See supra Section II.A.
122
Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 470 (recognizing that non-delegation
cases “do not yet, when taken together, evince a coherent constitutional
standard”).
123
For instance, the intermediate appellate court in Protz v. W.C.A.B.
(Derry Area Sch. Dist.), 124 A.3d 406, 412 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), held that all
delegations of authority to private entities violate the Pennsylvania
Constitution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately did not reach this
issue, though, concluding that the state’s incorporation by reference of the
AMA’s impairment standards could not withstand constitutional scrutiny
even if the AMA were a governmental entity. See Protz v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d at 837.
124
The list is not intended to be exhaustive, but instead to focus on those
factors that are most significant in the caselaw and relevant to states’
delegation of power to the NAIC. For instance, in addition to the factors
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analysis of legislative delegation to private actors: (1) whether the delegate
is a public or private entity; (2) whether the delegate’s exercise of authority
is directly policed by public officials, including courts or regulators; and (3)
the extent to which the delegate is independent from the lawmaking process
and exercising objective expertise rather than making policy.
1. Is the Delegate a Private or Public Entity?
For reasons described above, courts universally recognize that
legislative delegations of power to private actors raise more significant
constitutional concerns than delegations of power to government entities.125
Application of this principle is straight-forward in most cases, even though

discussed in this Section, legislatures may not delegate “inherent
government functions” to non-government entities. ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra
note 112, at 396; see, e.g., State v. Curley-Egan, 910 A.2d 200 (Vt. 2006)
(police power); Christ v. Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 644 A.2d 34, 42 (Md. 1994)
(dicta); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of
Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 424–26 (2006) (discussing
non-delegable government functions at the federal level). As a corollary,
courts are reluctant to allow delegations to private entities when the
delegated power involves criminal penalties. See, e.g., B.H. v. State, 645
So.2d 987, 993 (Fla. 1994); Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472. Courts
may also consider whether a delegation vests both rulemaking and
adjudicatory power in the same entity. Id. Finally, so long as the legislature
“determines the rights, duties, and liabilities of persons and corporations
under certain conditions of fact,” it may delegate (even to private parties)
“the duty of ascertaining when the facts exist which call into activity certain
provisions of the law.” State v. Gee, 236 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Ariz. 1951)
(quoting Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209, 219 (Wis. 1911)); accord State
v. Wakeen, 57 N.W.2d 364, 367 (Wis. 1953).
125
See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (labeling
delegation to private parties, “legislative delegation in its most obnoxious
form”); Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 730 (Md. 1989)
(“[D]elegations of legislative authority to private entities are strictly
scrutinized because, unlike governmental officials or agencies, private
persons will often be wholly unaccountable to the general public.”); Tex. Boll
Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 470.
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the public/private distinction is itself often hazy. 126 For instance,
corporations and professional associations are generally private, whereas
entities that are formed by statute, constitution, or regulation are typically
public.
But this distinction is less clear when legislatures create ostensibly
private entities and grant them legal or regulatory authority. In such cases,
courts typically resist formalistic analysis that gives definitive weight to the
delegate’s charter type. Instead, they typically weigh the relative role of
private citizens and government actors in controlling the delegate’s decisionmaking, operations, and objectives to determine whether the delegation is
public or private.
This focus on who controls a delegate’s operations is illustrated by
a Texas Supreme Court case invalidating a statute that created a foundation
and delegated to it control over an agricultural pest eradication program.
Despite the legislature’s creation of the foundation and specification of its
objectives, the court deemed the foundation to be private for purposes of the
non-delegation doctrine because its board was composed solely of farmers
with a direct private interest in the program’s implementation.127 Farmers’
control over the foundation rendered the delegation private because
“courts have universally treated a delegation as private where ‘interested
groups have been given authoritative powers of determination.’”128
Courts’ focus on who controls hybrid public/private entities that are
delegated authority is also illustrated by a recent U.S. Supreme Court case
applying the federal non-delegation doctrine. In Department of
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, the Court rejected a
non-delegation challenge to a statute empowering Amtrak to help develop
performance and service quality metrics for the broader industry.129 This
result followed from the Court’s conclusion that Amtrak was a public, rather
than a private, entity for purposes of the non-delegation doctrine,
notwithstanding its status as a for-profit corporation.130 Amtrak, the Court
emphasized, was not only created by federal law, but was controlled by
126

See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2003).
127
Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 471.
128
Id. at 470–71.
129
Dept. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015).
130
Id. at 1232–33.
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federal officials who played a major role in directing its objectives and
operations.131 For instance, Amtrak’s board is largely appointed by the
President, confirmed by the Senate, subject to removal at-will.132 Moreover,
the federal government owns nearly all of Amtrak’s stock.133 Amtrak is also
subject to various traditional government oversight tools: the Freedom of
Information Act applies to it, and it is required to maintain an inspector
general.
In addition to these formal government controls over Amtrak’s
operations, the Court emphasized that the federal government also holds
extensive practical control over the rail company. For instance, Amtrak is
required to submit annual reports to Congress, which frequently holds
hearings scrutinizing the company’s budget, routes, and service. Congress
also exercises extensive informal control over Amtrak by subsidizing the
company’s operations to a tune of $40 billion over the course of
approximately four decades. The federal government, the Court concluded,
“extensively supervise[s] and substantially fund[s]” Amtrak’s “priorities,
operations, and decisions.”134 In sum, the federal government’s control over
Amtrak rendered it a public entity for purposes of the non-delegation
doctrine, meaning that Congress’s delegation of power to the railroad raised
limited issues under the federal constitution.
2. Is the Private Delegate’s Exercise of Authority
Adequately Policed by Judges or Administrative
Bodies?
To the extent that a legislature has indeed delegated authority to a
private rather than a public actor, a second key consideration under states’
non-delegation doctrines is whether the private delegate’s power is
adequately policed by judges or administrative bodies. Both state and federal
courts have generally tolerated legislative delegations to private entities
when public officials exercise sufficient oversight over the private delegate’s
decision-making.135 Such oversight can come in varying forms, ranging from
131

Id. at 1232 (“[Amtrak] was created by the Government, is controlled
by the Government, and operates for the Government’s benefit.”).
132
Id. at 1231-32.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 1232.
135
See Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 928 P.2d 250, 258 (N.M. 1996); cf.
Sunshine Anthracite Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940) (holding
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judicial review of the entity’s compliance with substantive or procedural
requirements, to direct oversight of the delegate’s actions by a government
agency.136
For instance, courts generally permit delegations to private parties
when the delegating statute articulates substantive standards to guide the
delegate’s exercise of discretion, and compliance with these standards is
judicially reviewable.137 This approach, of course, parallels the rules that
govern delegations to public entities, such as agencies.138 It is therefore
hardly surprising that courts often conflate the rules governing these two
types of delegations.139 But consistent with the unique concerns implicated
by delegations to private entities, courts sometimes suggest that the
substantive constraints on private delegations must be more specific than

Congress may give private entities a role in rulemaking so long as the private
entity functions subordinately to the government); Pittston Co. v. United
States, 368 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[C]ongress may employ private
entities for ministerial or advisory roles, but it may not give these entities
governmental power over others.”). See generally Donna M. Nagy, Playing
Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private
Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1059 (2005) (“But court decisions,
including by the Supreme Court, demonstrate that governmental oversight
of private decision making will generally insulate Congress's private
delegations from constitutional challenge.”).
136
Compare United Chiropractors of Wash., Inc. v. State, 578 P.2d 38,
39–40 (Wash. 1978) (emphasizing the legislature’s obligation to establish
standards, guidelines, and procedural safeguards), with Tex. Boll Weevil
Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 473 (Tex. 1997), as
supplemented on denial of reh'g (Oct. 9, 1997) (analyzing Commissioner of
Agriculture’s direct oversight over private foundation, among several other
factors).
137
See, e.g., Newport Int’l Univ., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 186 P.3d 382,
390 (Wyo. 2008); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 735–36, 737–38
(Tex. 1998).
138
See supra Section II.A.
139
E.g., Colo. Polytechnic Coll. v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. &
Occupational Educ., 476 P.2d 38, 42 (Colo. 1970). But cf. Texas Boll
Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472–73 (establishing separate non-delegation test for
delegations to private entities).
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those on delegations to public actors.140 For instance, at least one court has
suggested that private delegations should be “narrow in duration, extent, and
subject matter.”141
A second way that public oversight may allow private delegations to
pass constitutional scrutiny is if the delegate’s authority must be exercised
in accordance with judicially-enforceable procedural restrictions.142 Here
too, the caselaw parallels precedent governing delegations to public
agencies, though comparison is slightly muddied because private entities are
not subject to procedural rules such as state administrative procedure acts
and sunshine laws. Procedural restrictions on private delegates’ capacity to
exercise delegated authority must consequently be contained within the
delegating statute. Such judicially-enforceable procedural restrictions on
delegations can help prevent arbitrary or self-interested decision-making by
the delegate.143 Because private delegations raise particularly salient
concerns of bias, courts reviewing challenges to such delegations often
emphasize whether parties affected by the delegate’s exercise of authority
are involved in the decision-making process, such as through a notice and
comment process.144
Procedural and substantive restrictions on a private delegate’s power
are only relevant for purposes of constitutional analysis if they are legally

140

Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 730 (Md.
1989) (“[D]elegations of legislative authority to private entities are strictly
scrutinized. . . .”); accord Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 469 (“[W]e
believe it axiomatic that courts should subject private delegations to a more
searching scrutiny than their public counterparts.”).
141
See Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472.
142
See supra Section II.A. As with the ordinary non-delegation doctrine,
some courts require a combination of procedural and substantive
restrictions. See, e.g., United Chiropractors of Wash., Inc. v. State, 578 P.2d
38, 39–41 (Wash. 1978).
143
See Protz v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827, 834 (Pa.
2017).
144
See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472–74 (analyzing statutory
requirement that private delegate’s board be elected by affected parties);
Indep. Electricians & Elec. Contractors' Ass'n v. N.J. Bd. of Examiners of
Elec. Contractors, 256 A.2d 33, 42 (N.J. 1969) (noting that private delegate’s
procedures in adopting and revising its standards reflect the national
consensus of interested parties).
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mandated and judicially reviewable, rather than voluntarily adopted.145 This
is because the non-delegation doctrine restricts legislatures’ ability to
delegate power “regardless of the manner in which the recipient wields it.”146
Thus, the fact that a delegate “has opted to use its powers for good,” such as
by self-imposing procedural restraints, “is no antidote” to a lack of
constitutional power.147
Judicial review of a delegate’s compliance with procedural or
substantive restrictions is not the only way that public oversight can
legitimize delegations of power to private actors. Direct oversight of a
private delegate’s decision-making by an administrative agency can also
curb arbitrary or self-interested actions sufficiently to avoid the
constitutional problems that undergird the non-delegation doctrine.148 This
strategy of administrative oversight of private delegates is central to
insulating from challenge a number of federal delegations of power to private
entities. For instance, the key private bodies that play a role in securities
regulation – including the Financial Standards Accounting Board (FASB),
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) – are all directly overseen by the SEC.149 In each case, federal courts
have rejected federal non-delegation challenges to these entities on the basis
of such direct oversight by the SEC.150

145

Although courts are not always explicit about the assumption that
procedural or substantive restrictions must be judicially reviewable, they
reliable operate on this assumption. See, e.g., Protz, 161 A.3d at 834, 836;
Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472–74. As one court has stated in the
context of a public non-delegation case, “a corollary of the doctrine of
unlawful delegation is the availability of judicial review.” Askew v. Cross
Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918 (Fla. 1978).
146
Protz, 161 A.3d at 835 n.4.
147
Id.; cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936)
(“[B]eneficent aims, however great or well directed, can never serve in lieu
of constitutional power.”).
148
See Tex. Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472–73 (describing agency
oversight of private delegate as “uneven and incomplete”).
149
Nagy, supra note 13535, at 1022, 1057–61.
150
See, e.g., Todd & Co. Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., 557 F.2d 1008,
1012–14 (3d Cir. 1977); R.H. Johnson & Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., 198
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Judicial or administrative oversight of a delegate may be
constitutionally sufficient when a public official retains discretion in
adopting or applying the standards.151 For instance, if enforcement of a
private delegate’s standards requires agency officials or judges to exercise
their discretion in applying the standard, or to use it as only one factor in
their decision-making, then there may be no impermissible delegation of
legislative power.152 In such cases, a government official maintains control
over the legal effects of a delegate’s decisions, meaning that the delegate
does not have unconstrained “power to determine what the law will be.”153
Other courts have suggested that delegations of power to private institutions
are more likely to be constitutionally permissible if impacted parties can seek
review from public officials of any adverse decision by the delegate.154
At least some commentators have suggested that, in addition to
judicial or administrative oversight, legislative oversight of a private
delegate is sufficient under the non-delegation doctrine.155 Under this view,
the key consideration for assessing the constitutionality of a private
delegation is “the ease with which Congress [or state legislatures] could
reclaim or amend its delegation.”156 Because legislatures generally do not

F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1952); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n., No. 76C-2832, 1978 WL 1073, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1978).
151
See Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 928 P.2d 250, 257 (N.M. 1996); Bd.
of Tr. of the Emp. Retirement Sys. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. v.
Mayor & City Council of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 732 (Md. 1989).
152
See, e.g., Madrid, 928 P.2d at 258 (“Where evidence is conflicting,
the ultimate decision concerning the degree of a worker’s impairment and
disability rests with the workers’ compensation judge.”); Bd. of Tr. of the
Emp. Retirement Sys., 562 A.2d at 732 (Md. 1989).
153
Madrid, 928 P.2d at 256.
154
See In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790, 796-797 (Minn. 1978); Newport
Int’l Univ., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 186 P.3d 382, 390 (Wyo. 2008).
155
See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A
Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1347, 1360-84 (1996).
156
Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”), 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1381, 1428 n.240 (2007).
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face constraints in clawing back power from private delegates, most such
delegations to private actors are unproblematic on this view.157
3. Does the Delegate’s Exercise of Authority Have
Significance Independent of the Incorporating Statute?
Another relevant factor to state constitutional analysis of private
delegations is whether the delegate’s actions have any significance
independent of the statute that delegated authority to it. To the extent that a
delegate’s exercise of authority is “guided by objectives unrelated to the
statute in which [the material] function[s],” then it is less plausible to
“construe [it] as a deliberate law-making act” of the type that would
potentially violate the non-delegation doctrine.158 This factor is most clearly
applicable to dynamic incorporations by reference, where a statute gives
legal effect to both existing and future versions of referenced material.159
However, courts have also considered a private delegate’s independent
purpose in cases where the delegate receives a more direct delegation of
authority from the legislature.160
A private delegate’s actions are likely to have significance
independent of a legislative delegation when they are motivated by concerns
that are not principally legal or regulatory. For example, when a private
entity updates standards that are dynamically incorporated by reference in a
statute to reflect scientific advances – rather than to influence the way the
statute operates – its actions have independent significance.161 This, of
course, is most likely to occur when the putative delegate has expertise that

157

See id.
Madrid, 928 P.2d at 257; accord Lucas v. Me. Comm’n of Pharmacy,
472 A.2d 904, 909 (Me. 1984).
159
See Boyd, supra note 117, at 1255–57.
160
See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen v. Abbott,
952 S.W.2d 454, 474–75 (Tex. 1997), as supplemented on denial of
reh'g (Oct. 9, 1997).
161
See, e.g., State v. Wakeen, 57 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Wis. 1953)
(upholding dynamic incorporation by reference of the United States
Pharmacopeia’s definition of drug); Madrid, 928 P.2d at 259 (upholding
incorporation of American Medical Association’s physical impairment
guidelines).
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is tied to a non-regulatory domain, such as science or education.162 The same
conclusion may follow when a private delegate’s standards are used in a
broad set of materials beyond the challenged statutory regime.163
By contrast, private entities that exercise delegated authority for the
sole or express purpose of influencing legal or regulatory standards are more
likely to face successful non-delegation challenges. Delegates may be so
influenced for a variety of reasons, including the prospect that they can reap
pecuniary benefits by influencing the law.164 For this reason, courts are often
particularly skeptical of delegations to private entities that hold the prospect
of substantially benefiting those parties’ finances.165
One alternative explanation for courts’ consideration of a private
delegate’s independence from the incorporating statute involves the practical
ability of legislatures to claw back power from the private delegate.166
Independent expert bodies that produce standards that happen to be
dynamically incorporated into state law are unlikely to directly pressure state
legislatures to retain their delegated authority. This means that the legislature
has no practical restrictions on its ability to claw back authority from the
delegate. By contrast, when private entities exercise delegated authority for
the sole purpose of influencing legal or regulatory standards, they are likely
to guard that authority jealously and employ various means to thwart the
legislature’s practical ability to claw back that authority.
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See, e.g., Colo. Polytechnic Coll. v. State Bd. for Cmty. Coll. &
Occupation Educ., 476 P.2d at 42 (Colo. 1970) (expertise in post-secondary
education); Lucas, 472 A.2d at 909–11 (pharmaceutical education); Hansen,
275 N.W.2d at 796–97 (legal education); Wakeen, 57 N.W.2d at 369
(pharmaceuticals).
163
See Lucas, 472 A.2d at 909–11 (listing several uses for American
Council on Pharmaceutical Education accreditation standards independent
of their use in Maine’s pharmaceutical licensure statute).
164
See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472; cf. Alexander Volokh, The
New Private- Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and
Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 941–42 (2014)
(“[D]elegation of power plus pecuniary bias is a due process faux-pas, and it
is easy to imagine (or presume) that such bias will be more likely if the
delegate is private.”).
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See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Texas Boll
Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472.
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See supra Section II.C.2.
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APPLICATION OF PRIVATE NON-DELEGATION FACTORS IN
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND ACCOUNTING DELEGATIONS

State courts have applied the considerations detailed above to
countless different legislative delegations of power to private entities,
ranging from organizations devoted to accrediting educational institutions to
bodies developing standards to protect individuals’ privacy. This subsection
focuses on caselaw analyzing delegations to private actors in two settings
that closely parallel state delegation of insurance regulatory authority to the
NAIC. The first involves state workers’ compensation statutes that rely on
materials produced by the American Medical Association to help assess a
worker’s physical impairment. The second focuses on delegations by both
federal and state actors to the Financial Accounting Standards Board to set
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
1. Workers’ Compensation Statutes and the American
Medical Association’s Impairment Guides
State workers’ compensation statutes frequently rely on the
American Medical Association’s (AMA) Impairment Guides to help
ascertain the severity of workers’ physical disabilities and ultimately their
compensation.167 When these statutes attempt to incorporate future versions
of the Guides as promulgated by the AMA, they raise a non-delegation
problem.168 However, courts applying the non-delegation factors above have
reached mixed conclusions regarding such statutes’ constitutionality.
For instance, in a 2017 case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck
down the state’s dynamic incorporation by reference of the AMA’s

167

See Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827, 835–36 (Pa.
2017) (“[T]he General Assembly gave the AMA de facto, unfettered control
over a formula that ultimately will determine whether a claimant’s partialdisability benefits will cease after 500 weeks.”); McCabe v. North Dakota
Workers Comp. Bureau, 567 N.W.2d 201, 205 (N.D. 1997).
168
In McCabe v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, the court
avoided the constitutional problems presented by dynamic incorporation by
holding that the statute’s language does not incorporate future changes to the
Guides. As such, the statute did not impermissibly delegate power to the
AMA. McCabe, 567 N.W.2d 201.
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impairment guidelines as an impermissible delegation.169 This scheme, the
court held, violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s vesting of legislative
power in the legislature because it did nothing to limit the AMA’s arbitrary
and capricious exercise of this delegated power, effectively giving it “de
facto, unfettered control over a formula” that determines a claimant’s
recovery.170 In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that the statute
failed to declare any policy regarding the Guides’ methods for evaluating
physical impairment or to prescribe any standards to guide the AMA in
creating its methodology.171 The court also noted a conspicuous lack of
procedural safeguards binding the AMA’s drafting process, such as notice
and comment procedures and judicial review.172 These factors ultimately led
the court to conclude that the state’s delegation of power to the AMA would
violate the State’s constitution even if the AMA were a governmental
entity.173 But the court expressly declined to reject either the intermediate
appellate court’s conclusion that all delegations of power to private entities
violate the Pennsylvania Constitution or the more moderate view that private
delegations require “a more exacting form of judicial scrutiny” than
delegations to public actors.174
By contrast, the Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the state’s
dynamic incorporation of the Guides. 175 In Madrid v. St. Joseph Hospital,
the court stressed that the AMA is a body with medical expertise that
produces the Guides based on scientific objectives, rather than solely for use
in New Mexico’s statute.176 It also emphasized that the statute made the
Guides only one factor in determining a worker’s right to compensation,
leaving the ultimate decision with the workers’ compensation judge. 177 Thus,
public officials retained some discretion in applying the Guides, supporting
the delegation.
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Protz, 161 A.3d at 841.
Id. at 836.
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Id. at 835–36.
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Id. at 836.
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Id. at 838.
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Id.
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Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 928 P.2d 250 (N.M. 1996).
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Id. at 257–58.
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Id. at 258; cf. McCabe v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 567 N.W.2d
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2. Delegation to FASB to Develop Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles
Both federal and state authorities delegate power to the Financial
Standards Accounting Board (FASB) to update GAAP. FASB’s authority
over GAAP stems from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to establish a
common system of accounting.178 The SEC initially sub-delegated this
authority to the primary trade association of the accounting profession,179 and
later shifted this delegation to FASB, a private, non-profit corporation whose
Board is selected by a panel of accounting professionals.180 FASB Board
members are full-time employees of FASB who are drawn from the
accounting profession. Although the SEC does not play any direct role within
FASB’s institutional structure, it devotes extensive resources to monitoring
the organization’s agenda and operations, through a dedicated SEC Office of
the Chief Accountant.181 Although the SEC has direct authority to overrule
FASB, it generally influences FASB decision making more subtly by using
suggestions and the implicit threat of a veto.182
Because the SEC’s delegation of power to FASB is a matter of
federal law, there is limited state case law on point. One exception is an
intermediate appellate case from Texas, which addressed a non-delegation
challenge to a Texas statute that required companies to compute their tax
obligations using “generally accepted accounting principles.”183 The Texas
Comptroller interpreted this provision to refer to GAAP, as promulgated by
FASB. In rejecting the argument that this interpretation amounted to an
178

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012).
See Nagy, supra note 135, at 985.
180
William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New
Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5
(2007).
181
Id. at 36.
182
Id. See also Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, The Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board:
Regulation Through Veto-Based Delegation, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 2, 7–14
(1994); D. Paul Newman, The SEC's Influence on Accounting Standards:
The Power of the Veto, 19 J. ACCT. RES. 134, 143 (1981).
183
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Sharp, 919 S.W.2d 485, 492 (Tex. App.–
Austin 1996).
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unconstitutional delegation of power to a private entity, the Texas court
emphasized that FASB “operates without reference to any legislative
purpose, and it does not make its pronouncements in order to fulfill or
effectuate any statute.”184 The Court also noted that the Comptroller’s rules
specifically did not make GAAP unconditionally binding on companies, but
instead instructed companies to depart from GAAP when “the context clearly
requires” doing so to avoid a misleading financial statement.185 Finally, the
court reasoned that aggrieved taxpayers could go before the Comptroller to
contest their tax liability. All this, the court held, demonstrated that “the
Comptroller, not FASB, holds and exercises the properly delegated power to
interpret and apply tax laws.”186
Federal caselaw also makes clear that the SEC’s sub-delegation of
authority to FASB is constitutional. Although no federal case explicitly
reaches this conclusion, federal courts have routinely rejected nondelegation
challenges to the SEC’s delegation of power to other private entities, such as
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). In doing so, they
generally emphasize that NASD’s decisions are "subject to full review by
the S.E.C., a wholly public body, which must base its decision on its own
findings."187 This logic, of course, is equally applicable to FASB. The
constitutionality of the SEC’s delegation to FASB is only enhanced by the
fact that Congress, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, conditioned FASB’s
authority on it meeting five conditions.188 These conditions required the
organization to be entirely private, maintain procedures ensuring prompt
consideration of emerging accounting issues, and to be deemed by the SEC
to be capable of improving the accuracy and effectiveness of financial
reporting and investor protection.189 These restrictions on FASB’s
composition and procedures, as well as the direct role for the SEC in
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Id.
Id.
186
Id.
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Todd & Co. v. Inc. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008, 1012–14 (3d Cir. 1977). See
also R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1952). For an
argument that the SEC’s delegation of power to FASB is indeed
unconstitutional. See Bruce Edward Committe, The Delegation and
Privatization of Financial Accounting Rulemaking Authority in the United
States of America, 1 CRITICAL PERSP. ACCT. 145 (1990).
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assessing FASB’s competence, render the constitutionality of the SEC’s
delegation to FASB clear.
III.

THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
INSURANCE REGULATORY REGIME

THE

U.S.

STATE

Each state has its own precedents regarding the constitutionality of
attempts by its legislature to delegate authority to private actors.190
Moreover, even within a single state, different legislative delegations of
authority to the NAIC pose distinct legal issues, as they vary with respect to
relevant factors such as the substantive and procedural guidance that
accompanies these delegations as well as state regulators’ discretion to
depart from dynamically-incorporated NAIC manuals.191 For these reasons,
it is impossible to conclusively assess the constitutionality of all state
delegations of authority to the NAIC in every jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this Section argues that most state delegations of
authority to the NAIC raise major constitutional problems under the nondelegation principles of most states. The analysis below explains this
conclusion by focusing on the three factors that state courts have generally
found to be influential in assessing the constitutionality of legislative
delegations to private parties.192 First, Section A explains that the NAIC is a
private entity for purposes of the non-delegation doctrine. Second, Section
B shows that the NAIC’s exercise of its delegated authority is not subject to
any meaningful oversight by the judiciary or individual state insurance
departments. Finally, Section C argues that the NAIC’s production of
dynamically-incorporated materials do not have significance independent of
legislative delegations to the organization. The fact that the NAIC actively
pressures state legislatures to delegate authority to it through its accreditation
program strongly supports this conclusion.
A.

THE NAIC IS A PRIVATE ACTOR FOR PURPOSES OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

As a private, non-profit corporation founded and controlled by state
insurance commissioners, the NAIC is in some ways at the border of the
190

See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section I.C.
192
See supra Section II.C.
191
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public/private divide. But when it comes to states’ non-delegation doctrines,
the NAIC’s status as a private entity is relatively clear. From a formalistic
perspective, this conclusion follows from the fact that the NAIC is registered
as a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation in the state of Delaware.193 As a
Delaware corporation, the NAIC is not subject to any of the safeguards that
ordinarily apply to government bodies, such as state Freedom of Information
Acts or Sunshine Laws.194
Although some courts confronting non-delegation claims have
resisted formalistic categorization of entities that are formed or controlled by
legislatures, these cases do not apply to the NAIC. Unlike these cases –
which are exemplified by Amtrak and the Texas Agricultural Pest
Eradication Foundation195 – state insurance regulators, rather than state
legislatures, founded the NAIC and control its operations.196 And they
193

See NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
(Adopted Oct. 1999), https://www.naic.org/documents/about_certificate_of
_incorporation.pdf. The fact that the NAIC is a registered non-profit
corporation, as compared to Amtrak’s status as a for profit corporation, may
arguably weigh in favor of its status as a public rather than private entity.
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit decision finding Amtrak to be a private entity
emphasized its status as a for profit corporation, noting that this mission was
at odds with the traditional mission of public entities to advance the common
good. See Ass’n of Am. Railroads v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666,
677 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded sub nom. Dep’t of Transp. v.
Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 191 L. Ed. 2d 153 (2015). By
contrast, the NAIC’s mission is expressly to “serv[e] the public interest” and
promote “fundamental insurance regulatory goals” by assisting “state
insurance regulators, individually and collectively.” See Mission, NAT’L
ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, https://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited
Oct. 4, 2018). As a charitable nonprofit, the NAIC also faces constraints on
its expenditure of funds and must disclose information that private entities
do not. But unlike virtually any other non-profit, the NAIC does not file
Form 990 annual disclosures about its budget and activities, relying on an
IRS private letter exempting it from this requirement. See Letter from Kevin
M. McCarthy, NAIC President, to Edward R. Royce, U.S. House of
Representatives (Mar. 20, 2012), https://www.naic.org/documents/committe
es_ex_grlc_120320_royce_letter.pdf.
194
These laws only apply to government entities.
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See supra Section II.C.1.
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formed it not to serve some independent public purpose, but instead to
operate as an association that could assist them in performing their
professional responsibilities.197 No court has ever held that a private
corporation founded by non-legislative officials to operate as a professional
association is a public entity for purposes of the non-delegation doctrine.
Even for courts inclined to embrace a less formalistic approach to
the public/private distinction, the NAIC’s private status for purposes of the
non-delegation doctrine is clear. Recall that courts employing such a
functional approach typically focus on the government’s control of the
delegate’s decision-making, operations and objectives.198 Because it is state
legislatures to whom state Constitutions delegate the legislative power, it is
the legislature’s control over a delegate that is the focus of this inquiry.199
Thus, Amtrak was a public entity because Congress played a central role in
its operations and delegated to the President authority to appoint its Board.200
Under this type of functional approach to the public/private divide,
the NAIC is almost certainly a private entity because no state legislature
exercises direct control over it. This conclusion follows from three
considerations. First, any control that state legislatures have over the NAIC
is fragmented among 56 jurisdictions.201 This is significant, as individual
states’ non-delegation doctrines are rooted in their individual
constitutions.202 Thus, the relevant question for any individual state is not
whether states in the aggregate exercise sufficient control over the NAIC to
render it a public entity. Instead, the relevant question is whether the
government of the specific state where a case is filed sufficiently controls the
NAIC. Fragmentation of state control over the NAIC means that the answer
to this question must be “no.” To analogize, if the Minnesota legislature were
to delegate authority to an Iowa agency, this delegation would best be
understood as private rather than public under the Minnesota Constitution,
because an Iowa agency is not democratically accountable to the people of
Minnesota.
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See supra Section II.C.1.
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See id.
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As discussed in Section I, the NAIC’s voting membership consists of
the fifty states plus six additional jurisdictions. See supra Section I.A.
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Fragmented control of the NAIC by fifty-six different state
insurance commissioners also undermines the organization’s accountability
to any individual state legislature. State legislatures have limited incentives
to directly monitor and attempt to exert control over national organizations
like the NAIC, even if they might plausibly be able to do so through their
influence over state insurance departments.203 This is but one example of a
familiar tragedy of the commons problem: the costs of any such oversight
would be borne entirely by the state, but the benefits would be diffused
nationally.204 By contrast, the federal government’s control over Amtrak, for
instance, allowed it to pursue a unified objective with respect to the
railroad.205
A second reason that the NAIC is a private entity even under a
functional approach to the non-delegation doctrine is that, unlike other
hybrid public-private entities, the NAIC is not subject to any supplemental
laws that imbue it with public features. Cases that have found ostensibly
private corporations like Amtrak to be public entities have highlighted the
unique constraints that legislatures imposed on these entities.206 To illustrate,
Amtrak was required by statute to comply with the Freedom of Information
Act, to maintain an Inspector General, and to regularly submit formal reports
to Congress.207 Even the Texas Boll Weavel foundation – which the court
ultimately deemed private – was subject to public safeguards, such as a
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See Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical Take on Group Regulation of
Insurers in the United States, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 537, 550 (2015) (noting
limited incentives of states insurance regulators to devote sufficient attention
to matters of national or international concern, like systemic risk).
204
Although state legislatures try to overcome these coordination
problems through organizations like the National Conference of Insurance
Legislatures (NCOIL), these efforts only prove the larger point: NCOIL is
universally understood to be a less prominent and important organization
than the NAIC, a telling fact given that state legislatures are generally
supposed to have oversight responsibilities over state regulators.
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See supra Section II.C.1.
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See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1232
(2015).
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requirement that it publish its rules and the prospect of dissolution by a
public official.208 No such requirements apply to the NAIC.
Finally, unlike the cases finding privately-chartered corporations to
be public for purposes of the non-delegation doctrine, states do not play a
meaningful role in funding the NAIC. To the contrary, state funds ultimately
contribute a tiny fraction to the NAIC’s budget.209 The vast majority of the
NAIC’s revenue instead stems from its sale of services and publications to
the insurance industry.210 This is significant, as it means that states have
limited informal control over the NAIC’s actions flowing from their financial
backing of the organization.211
The NAIC, in sum, is a private entity for purposes of states’ nondelegation doctrines. Under a formalistic analysis, this conclusion flows
naturally from the fact that the NAIC is chartered as a Delaware corporation
founded by state regulators, rather than state legislatures. From a more
functional perspective, states’ fragmented control over the organization
means that it is not controlled by or accountable to any individual state. State
legislatures also lack any indirect authority over the NAIC as it is not subject
to any supplemental public safeguards and it is funded almost entirely by its
sale of services and publications to the insurance industry.
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See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952
S.W.2d 454, 470-471 (Tex. 1997), as supplemented on denial of reh'g (Oct.
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Although the insurance industry clearly exercises much less control
over the NAIC’s operations than did the private farmers in the Boll Weavel
case, their influence on the NAIC is different in kind than ordinary industry
influence on state agencies. The NAIC’s open meeting policy has no parallel
for government agencies, where the default assumption is that meetings
among staff will be “closed” to the industry. This practice – coupled with the
fact that so much of the NAIC’s work takes place through meetings
conducted within the committee structure – ensures that the industry has a
major voice in virtually every facet of the NAIC’s operations. So too does
the fact that the NAIC’s conflict of interest policy is much weaker than
almost any individual states, allowing in the most extreme cases for NAIC
officers to switch within months from chairing an NAIC committee to
representing industry interests before that committee.
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THE NAIC’S EXERCISE OF DELEGATED AUTHORITY IS NOT
SUBJECT TO MEANINGFUL PUBLIC OVERSIGHT

Unlike other private entities that are permissibly delegated legal
authority by state legislatures, the NAIC’s exercise of delegated authority is
not subject to meaningful oversight by either state judiciaries or
administrative agencies.212 This point is straight-forward with respect to
judicial oversight, as the NAIC’s decision-making is not judicially
reviewable.213 But the lack of NAIC oversight by state insurance departments
requires more explanation given the dominant role of state regulators in
directing the organization and producing its work product.214 Subsection One
first explains why state regulators’ direct role in producing the NAIC’s
dynamically-incorporated materials does not constitute public oversight of
the type that is relevant for purposes of states’ non-delegation doctrines.
Subsection Two then suggests that individual state regulators’ capacity to
depart from NAIC-drafted materials in specified circumstances also does not
result in sufficient public oversight of the NAIC under non-delegation
caselaw.
1. State Regulators’ Direct Role in Developing NAIC
Materials Does Not Constitute Public Oversight
When legislatures delegate lawmaking authority to private
organizations, they often task state agencies with monitoring and overseeing
this exercise of authority.215 Public officials in these schemes do not directly
control the private delegate’s decision making. Instead, they maintain their
independence from the delegate to ensure that it is exercising its
legislatively-delegated authority effectively, fairly, and efficiently. To
illustrate, Congress authorized the SEC to sub-delegate authority over
accounting rules to FASB.216 But FASB itself is comprised entirely of private
individuals with accounting expertise, rather than any SEC officials.217 The
role of the SEC in this scheme is to actively monitor how FASB exercises its
delegated authority to ensure that its deliberations and determinations are not
212

See supra Section II.C.2.
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214
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unfairly biased or inadequately sensitive to relevant public policy
concerns.218
The NAIC turns this structure on its head. State insurance regulators
do not independently oversee the NAIC’s exercise of authority. Instead, they
directly exercise this authority through their participation in the NAIC’s
internal processes.219 Thus, state insurance regulators acting under the
auspices of the NAIC set the terms of the Valuation, AP&P, and ORSA
manuals, relying only on private parties, like NAIC staff and industry, to
advise them in this process rather than to exercise this authority directly. 220
By directly exercising the authority delegated to the NAIC, public officials
produce rules with the force of law while avoiding any independent oversight
whatsoever. State regulators’ exercise of the NAIC’s delegated authority is
also exempt from any of the other constraints that ordinarily accompany
officials’ public actions, such as laws governing conflicts of interest and
transparency.221
This lack of independent oversight undermines the due process
values that are at the heart of courts’ skepticism of private delegations.222
Independent oversight of private delegates’ exercise of authority promotes
due process for a variety of reasons. Perhaps most importantly, it limits the
risk of biased decision-making by private delegates, a concern that courts
repeatedly emphasize in the caselaw examining the enhanced constitutional
concerns associated with private delegations.223
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See supra Section II.D.2. Similarly, the American Medical
Association’s impairment standards ultimately are applied by state actors–
Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judges–who are not
themselves AMA members. See also supra Section II.D.1.
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See supra Section I.
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See supra Section II.B. Of course, other Due Process values are also
served by independent oversight of a private delegate’s exercise of power.
For instance, independent oversight helps ensure that rules with the force of
law are evaluated from two independent perspectives, thus reducing the
potential influence of group think or hidden biases. Just like a student cannot
reliably grade her own work, state regulators cannot meaningfully oversee
the production of materials that they themselves produce.
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The risk that the NAIC will exhibit bias in exercising its delegated
power is notable. State insurance regulators operating under the auspices of
the NAIC may have substantial interests in using their delegated authority to
expand the NAIC’s power and improve its finances. For instance, state
insurance regulators may use the NAIC’s authority to inflate the scope and
complexity of statutory accounting principles.224 Doing so can increase the
value of regulators’ specialized insurance expertise, limit the risk of
perceived encroachment on their turf by federal officials,225 and improve the
NAIC’s capacity to fund its operations by selling updates AP&P manuals.226
State regulators’ exercise of authority through the NAIC may be
biased in other ways as well. For instance, state regulators can, and do,
increasingly use the NAIC to raise, pursue, and implement difficult policies
in a private forum, away from democratic accountability. By increasing the
scope of issues that are regulated through NAIC manuals, rather than via
ordinary administrative actions within individual insurance departments,
state regulators can avoid the ordinary costs and difficulties associated with
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There are good reasons to be skeptical that effective insurance
regulation truly requires unique accounting principles as detailed and
extensive as those found within statutory accounting. For an overview of
how statutory accounting differs from GAAP, see Background on: Insurance
Accounting, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/publications/insurancehandbook/regulatory-and-financial-environment/background-on-insuranceaccounting (last visited, Oct. 8, 2018).
225
For instance, insurance companies that are not publicly held only
report their financial status using statutory accounting. However, many of
the regulatory tools used by federal regulators are specifically designed for
GAAP reporting. This fact has substantially complicated the Federal
Reserve’s ability to regulate insurance-focused savings and loan holding
companies. See generally Legislative Review of H.R. 5059, The State
Insurance Regulation Preservation Act Before the U.S. H. of Reps. Comm.
on Financial Servs. and the Subcomm. on Hous. & Ins., Insurance Summit
(2018) (testimony of Daniel Schwarcz, Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School).
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As discussed above, the NAIC sells access to the AP&P manual to
help fund its operations. See supra Section I. There is a good argument that
the AP&P manual should not be protected by intellectual property laws given
its status as state law. See Cunningham, supra note 34.
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complying with their individual states’ administrative laws.227 For instance,
rather than promulgating new regulations regarding group capital
requirements – a controversial and complex topic228 – states can simply avoid
any legal process by inserting new rules on this topic into the ORSA
guidance manual.229
Even if state regulators’ participation in the NAIC were somehow
construed to constitute public oversight of the organization, this would still
likely not satisfy state constitutional requirements. This is because, as noted
above, the relevant perspective for purposes of evaluating non-delegation
principles is that of an individual state, not states collectively.230 And from
the perspective of any individual state, its public officials will generally play
a minimal or non-existent role in exercising the NAIC’s authority. The
NAIC’s individual committees are comprised of regulators from a variety of
different states.231 As such, when those committees approve of changes to
materials that are dynamically incorporated by reference, public officials
from any single state will, at most, play only a limited role in producing or
reviewing these materials.
While laudable, the NAIC’s efforts to promote involvement of
various stakeholders in its deliberations does not alter this analysis. Recall
that the NAIC actively encourages industry and consumer stakeholder
participation in its operations, both by maintaining a robust open meetings
policy and by covering the costs of consumer-representatives to participate
in its deliberations.232 But none of these efforts come close to constituting
the type of oversight that constitutional principles generally demand for
227

Robert Williams coined the term “substance creep” to describe this
phenomenon in a talk describing some of the potential risks associated with
states’ dynamic incorporation-by-reference of NAIC materials.
228
See Bilateral Agreement Between the United States of America and
the European Union on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and
Reinsurance, Sept. 22, 2017, E.U.-U.S., T.I.A.S. 18-404 [hereinafter
Covered Agreement]. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 203. Recently, the
United States agreed in a “covered agreement” with the E.U. The agreement
creates an expectation that state insurance regulators will develop and
implement a group capital “requirement or assessment.”
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private delegations. The reason is simple: stakeholders who participate in the
NAIC’s deliberations have no formal authority to vote on or otherwise
directly influence the organization’s work product. Indeed, NAIC consumer
representatives have complained public and privately for years that the NAIC
merely pays lip service to consumer interests while generally doing little to
promote real change.233 As such, their participation in the NAIC’s operations
cannot coherently be considered oversight.
Also, praiseworthy but irrelevant for purposes of constitutional
analysis are the NAIC’s various internal procedures for publicly exposing
working drafts and voting on changes to these materials. As discussed above,
a private delegate’s voluntarily-adopted procedures for exercising its
authority have nothing to do with the power that the legislature has delegated
to that entity.234 Because compliance with these standards is not legally
mandated, the NAIC can always change, or simply ignore, these internal
rules with no consequence.
2. State Insurance Departments’ Capacity to Depart from
NAIC Manuals Does not Result in Meaningful
Oversight of the NAIC
The only plausible way that individual state insurance departments
can be understood to exercise public oversight over the NAIC is through their
authority to depart from dynamically-incorporated NAIC materials in
specified circumstances. State insurance departments’ capacity to authorize
such departures varies by topic and state. However, a common structure –
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See, e.g., Comments of CFA and CEJ to Auto Insurance Working
Group Regarding the August 10, 2018 Draft “Report” Outline, CONSUMER
FED’N OF AM. (Sept. 1, 2018), https://consumerfed.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/cfa-cej-comments-naicautowg.pdf. One notable
exception is that the NAIC consumer liaison program seemingly had a large
impact on the organization’s implementation of the Affordable Care Act. See
Timothy Jost, Reflections on The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners and Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2043 (2011).
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Consumer Federation of America, supra note 204; Jost, supra note
204; cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936) (“[B]eneficent
aims, however great or well directed, can never serve in lieu of constitutional
power.”).
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reflected in both the Valuation and AP&P Manuals235 – is that individual
state insurance departments can either promulgate regulations authorizing
departures from specific provisions within dynamically-incorporated NAIC
manuals for all insurers, or else they can permit such departures for
individual insurers who apply for exemptions.236
State Departments’ limited authority to depart from NAIC manuals
is in some ways comparable to other types of public oversight of private
delegations that Courts have found significant. For instance, as described
earlier, one court tolerated a state’s prospective incorporation by reference
of GAAP in part because aggrieved taxpayers could contest their tax liability
before the state Comptroller.237 And a key element of the SEC’s oversight
over FASB and other private delegates is its capacity to veto individual
rules,238 an authority that is comparable to individual insurance departments’
authority to depart from portions of dynamically incorporated NAIC
manuals.
Notwithstanding these similarities, individual states’ capacity to
depart from NAIC-produced material should not be deemed sufficient public
oversight of the NAIC to stave off a non-delegation challenge. This is for
two fundamental reasons. First, state insurance departments’ actual capacity
to depart from NAIC materials is extremely limited as a practical matter.
Second, individual states’ authority to depart from NAIC materials does not
empower them to more broadly influence the NAIC’s exercise of its
delegated authority.
Consider first the practical limits on states’ capacity to depart from
NAIC materials that are dynamically incorporated by reference into state
law. Unlike other public overseers of private delegates, individual state
insurance departments must promulgate regulations to reject rules contained
within dynamically-incorporated NAIC materials.239 Doing so, of course, is
time consuming, costly, and itself subject to judicial challenge. By contrast,
states need merely do nothing to accept the NAIC’s exercise of delegated
authority. This scheme inhibits state insurance departments’ oversight of the
235

See supra Section I.C.
In the statutory accounting context, the former are referred to as
prescribed practices, whereas the latter are referred to as permitted practices.
237
See supra Section II.D.2 (describing Cent. Power & Light Co. v.
Sharp, 919 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App. 1996)).
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NAIC by making it both costly and difficult. Consistent with this fact, state
insurance departments almost never promulgate rules departing from
dynamically incorporated NAIC materials.
To be sure, states are empowered to authorize specific departures
from NAIC rules for individual insurers without promulgating regulations.240
But this power to grant individual exemptions to insurers cannot be
understood to constitute oversight of the NAIC’s delegated power. Instead,
it simply allows insurance departments to recognize individual instances
where the NAIC’s rules may not be appropriate.241 Moreover, this type of
individualized exercise of discretion requires insurers to affirmatively
request an exemption; it is not a necessary incident of the NAIC’s exercise
of delegated power. By contrast, courts that have authorized workers’
compensation statues that dynamically incorporate AMA impairment
standards have emphasized that administrative law judges must apply these
standards using their discretion in order for them to have the force of law.242
States’ capacity to meaningfully exercise their authority to depart
from dynamically incorporated NAIC materials is also limited by the sheer
scope of these materials. As described above, states delegate an immense
array of different authorities to the NAIC, encompassing not just the rules
governing accounting, reserving, and corporate governance, but also a wide
range of additional topics.243 In many ways, the NAIC essentially controls
all aspects of financial regulation of U.S. insurers: The entire accounting
system comes from NAIC in the AP&P Manual, and the entire method of
analyzing and examining insurers’ finances and governance is found in the
Financial Condition Examiners Handbook and Financial Analysis
Handbook. 244 States simply do not have the practical bandwidth to
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There is nothing discrete about NAIC’s involvement in setting
regulatory policy. Instead, by design, the NAIC has since 1990 attempted to
“establish a national system of uniform insurance regulation” with itself at
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tagline used in all its official statements, which concludes with the
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meaningfully monitor the NAIC’s actions across all of these domains.245
Perhaps reflecting this difficulty of effectively monitoring expansive
delegations of power to private actors, at least one court has suggested that
the scope of a state’s delegation of power to a private entity is itself relevant
to whether it is constitutionally permissible.246
Apart from these practical limits on state insurance departments’
capacity to depart from dynamically incorporated NAIC materials, any such
departures do not, in fact, operate as a form of oversight over the NAIC. The
mere fact that one or even several states exercise their authority to depart
from NAIC-produced materials does not empower those states to influence
the NAIC more broadly. Even in such cases, the NAIC’s manuals have the
force of law in the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions. The upshot of this
reality is that, unlike other public watchdogs of private parties who are
delegated authority, states have limited capacity to transform their veto
authority into soft power that can influence the NAIC’s actions. Compare,
for instance, the power that an individual state wields vis a vis the NAIC
relative to the SEC’s veto power over FASB. As noted above, the SEC
doesn’t need to use its veto authority in order for it to dramatically influence
FASB’s decision-making, because the veto threat is typically enough.247 No
individual state can similarly transform whatever veto authority it has into a
broader capacity to oversee the NAIC’s operations.
C.

THE NAIC’S EXERCISE OF DELEGATED AUTHORITY IS NOT
INDEPENDENT FROM THE DELEGATING STATUE

Even state statutes that dynamically incorporate by reference
materials that are produced by private organizations without any meaningful
public oversight may not violate Constitutional non-delegation principles. At
least some courts have approved of such legislative delegations when the
245

See Improving U.S. Insurance Regulation, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR.
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private organization is an independent, expert body, as illustrated by the
conflicting caselaw on workers’ compensation statutes that dynamically
incorporate by reference impairment standards produced by the American
Medical Association.248 At first blush, states’ prospective incorporation-byreference of the NAIC’s materials may seem defensible under this precedent;
the NAIC undoubtedly possesses a massive amount of insurance expertise,
both among its direct employees and as a result of its network of state
insurance regulators.249
But unlike any of these cases where courts have approved of
prospective statutory incorporation by reference of a private expert body’s
standards, the NAIC’s production of these standards is not independent of
the law-making process. To the contrary, the entire purpose of the NAIC’s
production of dynamically-incorporated materials is to set the terms by
which state insurance regulation operates. Unlike, for instance, the AMA’s
impairment standards – which can help medical professionals perform their
professional obligations for reasons having nothing to do with workers’
compensation – the materials contained in the various dynamicallyincorporated NAIC materials have no independent purpose aside from state
insurance regulation. To illustrate, statutory accounting principles require
different accounting standards than GAAP ostensibly to facilitate regulators’
capacity to assess whether an insurer will be able to pay its future claims.250
Similarly, the NAIC’s valuation manual exist solely to ensure that carriers
meet regulatory expectations in setting aside appropriate funds to pay future
claims.251
Not only are the NAIC’s dynamically incorporated materials created
for the express purpose of binding insurers and insurance regulators, but the
NAIC actively pressures states to adopt these standards through its
accreditation program. The pressure that the NAIC’s accreditation program
places on states to delegate authority to the NAIC is described in detail in
Part I.252 The key point here, though, is that this type of pressure directly
undermines any plausible claim that the NAIC’s dynamically-incorporated
materials are produced from some reason independent of their legal
authority. It is one thing for a private organization to exercise delegated
authority for the sole purpose of influencing legal rules. But independence is
248
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even more lacking when an organization like the NAIC exercises this power
only after actively pressuring states to delegate this authority to them.
In fact, the NAIC’s accreditation program strikes at the heart of the
constitutional concerns that motivate states’ non-delegation doctrines by
undermining state legislatures’ practical ability to claw back power from the
NAIC.253 Simply put, the NAIC faces no practical risk that state legislatures
will limit its authority when it uses that authority to further inflate its
prominence in state insurance regulation, enhance its revenue, and allow
state regulators to fundamentally alter state insurance law without any
legally-mediated public accountability. At the end of the day, no state can
make a realistic threat that it will reverse its delegation of authority to the
NAIC, because doing so would trigger significant tax and employment
repercussions for the state. Rather than legislatures delegating authority to
the NAIC, the NAIC has – in a quite real sense – successfully constructed a
scheme where it delegates to itself the authority to shape insurance regulation
as it sees fit, with no public accountability or legally-mandated process.
Ultimately, a substantial portion of U.S. insurance regulation rests
on a constitutionally-shaky foundation. As a private entity that is not
controlled by state legislatures and unaccountable to any independent public
authority, the NAIC’s direct exercise of delegated power violates core
principles of every states’ constitutions. The question, of course, becomes
what should states do about this problem.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF U.S. INSURANCE
REGULATION

Recognizing the unconstitutional foundations of U.S. insurance
regulation would complicate the capacity of states to effectively regulate
insurers. But it would not undermine states’ insurance regulation writ large.
This Part explains that conclusion. First, Part A briefly considers both the
positive and negative impacts of simply eliminating state delegations of
power to the NAIC. Although this approach would increase accountability
and decrease bias in the production of state insurance regulation, it would
also undermine the uniformity and agility of such regulation. For this reason,
Part B suggests one approach to preserving states’ reliance on the NAIC
while instituting safeguards that would ensure constitutional protections:
creating an interstate insurance compact that would be staffed by
253
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independent experts in insurance regulation and responsible for reviewing
the production of new NAIC materials that have the force of law.
A.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELIMINATING STATES’ DYNAMIC
CROSS REFERENCES TO NAIC MATERIALS

The unconstitutional structure of state insurance regulation is easily
remediable. State insurance laws could simply be revised – either directly by
state legislatures, or judicially, by courts severing the unconstitutional
portions of these laws – so that they only cross-referenced versions of NAIC
materials that were finalized before those state laws were enacted.254 This
would mean that NAIC changes to statutorily cross-referenced materials
would only have the force of law to the extent that state legislators, after
having a chance to review these changes, approved of these materials.255
State legislatures wishing to delegate this review process to their state
insurance departments could easily do so by directly empowering them to
adopt via regulation updated versions of cross-referenced NAIC materials.
These reforms would increase the NAIC’s accountability and
transfer power back to states, where it rightly resides under the current US
insurance regulatory framework. In doing so, these reforms could have a
substantial impact on the substance of the materials the NAIC adopted in its
various manuals. Controversial changes would likely prompt much closer
legislative or regulatory scrutiny which, in turn, would have a disciplining
effect on what the NAIC chose to include in these materials, leading it to shy
away from shoe-horning controversial or substantive provisions into its
manuals and guides. This reform would also assure impacted parties of the
opportunity to challenge any elements of the NAIC-produced materials that
they objected to through the ordinary safeguards built into state legislative
or regulatory processes.
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See supra section II.B (discussing the fact that non-prospective crossreferences are not delegations of power, but simply legislative short-hand).
255
In most cases, states could presumably will to do this through
omnibus legislation that would be adopted without serious controversy or
debate. For this approach to work, the NAIC would be forced to revise its
accreditation program standards to clarify that updated NAIC-produced
manuals, guides, and the like need only be adopted by states after a
reasonable period of time for review and evaluation of those materials by
state legislators.
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At the same time, this approach could have significant drawbacks by
undermining the uniformity and agility of state insurance regulation. A
substantial benefit of the NAIC’s dynamic incorporation by reference
approach is that it allows state insurance regulation to quickly and uniformly
respond to emerging regulatory issues. Moreover, states’ lack of uniform
insurance regulation has proven to be a substantial problem in a variety of
settings. Such inconsistencies increase the costs of compliance for
insurers,256 create the prospect of regulatory arbitrage,257 and potentially
undermine the effectiveness of state insurance regulation.258 For these
reasons, it is worthwhile to consider whether reforms to the structure of state
insurance law and regulation could simultaneously preserve the NAIC’s role
in drafting dynamically-incorporated materials for state law while limiting
the constitutional infirmities of this approach.
B.

A PROPOSED INTERSTATE COMPACT TO ESTABLISH
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE NAIC'S EXERCISE OF
DELEGATED AUTHORITY

Eliminating state delegations of power to the NAIC would clearly
have both costs and benefits. But there is a potential way for state legislatures
to avoid this tradeoff by constitutionally delegating power to the NAIC. In
particular, they could create, through an interstate compact, an independent
public entity that would be tasked with reviewing the NAIC’s exercise of
delegated authority.
As discussed above, state delegations of power to private entities are
generally constitutionally permissible if they are subject to independent
oversight by state courts or agencies.259 But simply applying this approach
to the NAIC could create substantial practical problems if the NAIC’s
revisions of dynamically incorporated materials were independently
reviewed in each state, then many of the benefits of consolidating the
256
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production of these standards at the NAIC might be lost. The rules of state
insurance regulation contained in dynamically incorporated materials could
be rejected or revised by individual states, potentially leading to the same
patchwork of rules that motivated creation of the NAIC accreditation
program in the first place. 260
An interstate compact could allow states to avoid these practical
problems while simultaneously assuring that their delegations of power to
the NAIC are constitutionally compliant. In particular, states could use an
interstate compact to create a new multistate public entity whose sole
responsibility would be to independently review the NAIC’s exercise of
delegated authority. In this sense, the new entity’s role would resemble the
SEC’s oversight of FASB or even state courts’ oversight of state agencies
under basic administrative law principles. Thus, the new entity created by
interstate compact could focus on assessing whether the NAIC’s production
of materials that have the force of law adhered to various procedural and
substantive constraints. Such review, as in both ordinary administrative law
and the SEC’s oversight of FASB, would presumably be deferential in
recognition of the NAIC’s expertise.261 Subjecting the NAIC’s exercise of
delegated authority to review by an independent, multistate entity created by
interstate compact would almost certainly solve the constitutional problems
embedded within the current U.S. insurance regulatory framework. As
discussed at length above, oversight by an independent, public entity is
usually sufficient to insulate delegations of power to a private entity from
constitutional scrutiny.262 Meanwhile, there is little doubt that state
legislatures could constitutionally delegate oversight of the NAIC to a new
multistate entity that they created by interstate compact, rather than to their
own state courts or agencies. It is well established that state legislatures can,
via interstate compact, constitutionally create a multistate public agency to
formulate regulatory standards.263 It seemingly follows that states could also
constitutionally empower such a multistate entity with responsibility for
scrutinizing a private delegate’s development of regulatory standards.264
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This proposed approach would not only meet state constitutional
requirements, but it would preserve the practical benefits associated with
consolidating the production of financial regulatory standards within the
NAIC. The NAIC would continue to be in charge of updating materials that
are dynamically incorporated by reference in state law, thus avoiding any
substantial disruption in the mechanics of state insurance regulation. For
similar reasons, the proposed approach would also continue to take
advantage of the NAIC’s expertise and knowledge in producing the detailed
rules of insurance regulation.
Using an interstate compact to create a new multistate entity with a
role in insurance regulation is not without precedent. To the contrary, in 2004
participating states created an Interstate Insurance Product Regulation
Commission (IIPRC) as “a joint public agency.” The IIPRC began operating
in 2006 and, as of September 2014, 44 states had enacted legislation agreeing
to the Compact, representing over 70% of national premium volume.265
Consistent with its public status, the IIPRC is legally required to adhere to a
number of procedural requirements. For instance, it must follow “a
rulemaking process that conforms to the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act of 1981” and provide advance written notice of its intent to
adopt new standards.266 Similarly, any standards it promulgates can be
judicially challenged in much the same manner as ordinary regulations.267
The key difference between the proposal here and the IIPRC is that
the new multistate public entity proposed here would be responsible for
overseeing the NAIC’s production of regulatory rules with the force of law,
rather than creating those rules itself. As such, it would need to be structured
politically accountable to the populations of other states. But this criticism
would be muted in the context of a public entity that was affirmatively
created by state legislatures to ensure that the NAIC’s exercise of delegated
authority was itself reasonable.
265
The IIPRC reviews policy forms based on uniform rules that it
promulgates in coordination with the NAIC. IIPRC product rules are initially
devised by NAIC and IIPRC committees and subjected to a sixty-day public
comment period. To be adopted, they must be approved by 2/3 of the IIPRC
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differently from the IIPRC. Perhaps most importantly, unlike the IIPRC, the
proposed multistate entity would need to be independent of the NAIC and
state insurance regulators. Consistent with the entity’s adjudicative role, this
could be accomplished by staffing it with a rotating panel of state appellate
judges.
An alternative approach to remedying the unconstitutional structure
of state insurance regulation would be to entirely relocate the production of
materials that have the force of law from the NAIC to the newly-created
multistate entity. This proposal – which would hew closely to the IIPRC
approach – would more directly solve the constitutional infirmities of the
present state insurance regulatory system by shifting states’ delegations of
power to a public multistate entity, rather than by subjecting the NAIC’s
exercise of delegated authority to oversight by that entity. As such, its
structure could directly mirror the IIPRC, both with respect to applicable
procedural requirements and membership. The most significant drawback of
this approach is that it could substantially disrupt the current processes for
producing materials that are dynamically incorporated by reference in state
law.
But whatever the details, creating a new single, publiclyaccountable, entity to play a role in overseeing or producing uniform
regulatory standards represents one promising approach to addressing the
unconstitutionality of the present state-based regulatory scheme while
preserving most of its benefits.
CONCLUSION
Despite ubiquitous rhetoric emphasizing the primacy of states in
insurance regulation, the NAIC in many ways operates as a national regulator
of the business of insurance. But unlike any other regulator, the NAIC is
completely unaccountable to legislatures or judicial officers, either at the
state or federal level. The NAIC’s accreditation program further undermines
its accountability, allowing it to effectively compel states to preserve and
expand its delegated authority. This unconstitutional structure has allowed
the NAIC to broaden its power, size, and reach, in ways that often have
dubious social value. It is now time for states to take back their power from
rogue state insurance regulators by holding the NAIC accountable. Doing so
need not undermine the structure of state insurance regulation. By using the
interstate compact process to create a public entity that would review the
NAIC’s actions that have the force of law, states can reign in the NAIC’s
excessive power while preserving the capacity of state insurance regulation
to produce uniform and agile standards.

